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The Sources and Limits of
Freedom of Religion in a
Liberal Democracy: Section
2(a) and Beyond
PAUL HORWITZ*

Freedom of religion stands on precariousground in the landscape of the modern
liberal democratic state. While the state and the courts rely on the tools of rational, secular, "neutral" reasoning to strike a balance between protecting individual
freedoms and achieving important state goals, the religiousadherent is driven by an
understanding of existence that defies the liberal tradition of rationalism. In this article, the authorexamines the conflicts that occur between religious obligationsand
the needs of the state. Through an examination of Canadianand Americanjurisprudence concerningfreedom of religion, the authorprovides a critique of some aspects
of the modem liberal state's treatment of religion. The author seeks to provide a
clear picture of the social and intrinsicvalue of religion, and suggests that a proper
understanding of the value of religion will lead the state to adopt a supportive and
accommodatingapproach toward religiousbeliefs and practicesin the modern state.
L',tat d6mocratique libiral moderne est un terrain mouvant pour la libertd d'expression. L'itat et les tribunauxse fient a un outillage mental rationel,profane et
impartialen pour ddterminerl'quilibre optimal entre la protection des libert6s individuelles et l'atteinte de buts pr6ns par la collectiviti. Or, le croyant s'inspire
d'une conception de l'existence humaine oftrang~re a la traditionlibirale de rationalitg. Dans cet article, l'auteur 9tudie les conflits entre l'obligation religieuse et
*
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les besoins de l'ltat.Parune analyse de lajurisprudencecanadienne et amdricaine
concernantla libert6 de religion l'auteurprsente une critique de certains aspects
du traitementde la religionparl'Etat libeiralmoderne. L'auteurcherche 6 presenter
un portraitlucide de la valeursociale et intrins~quede la religion. 11 suggre qu'une
comprhension addquate de la religion mnera l'ltat 6 une attitude conciliante et
solidaire envers les pratiques et croyances religieuses.
Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather
than men.
-

Acts 5:29

Whatever the subject of your disputes, the final word belongs to God.
- The Korant
I. Introduction
The religious believer in the modem liberal state is the servant of two masters.
On the one hand, there is the web of obligations, laws and rules that attach to
every facet of life, from prohibitions against criminal behaviour to the myriad
administrative regulations encountered in the workplace. On the other, there is the
compulsion to obey one's spiritual obligations, as revealed through prayer, scripture,
or participation in a faith community. As long as the two obligations do not conflict,
one can fulfill both sets of requirements. Once they do, both the religious adherent
and the state face the question: Which should be valued more highly-obligations
to temporal authority or to divine authority?
The object of this article is to suggest that how we answer this question will
help provide the answer to a broader question: Can the modern state accommodate
views that deviate from the social and political norm, and which operate in a realm
apart from the societal norm of liberalism, or will the state be blind to those whose
claims are grounded in experiences and beliefs that lie beyond the paradigm of
rationality and liberalism?
In Canada, the conflict between religion and the state has often played itself out
in struggles over whether the social structure must give equal support to different
religious groups; for example, the struggles over the Sunday shopping laws 2 or
the entitlement of religious communities to funding for the separate education of
their children.3 Less concern has been given to the question whether the state and
its laws may interfere with pre-existing religious obligations, and thereby force an
1. The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood (London: Penguin Classics, 1993) at 339.
2. See e.g. R. v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Big Al];
Edwards Books and Art v. R. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter EdwardsBooks].
3. See e.g. Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to amend the Education Act (Ontario) (1987), 40 D.L.R.

(4th) 18 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Reference Re Bill 30]; Adler v. Ontario (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 1
(C.A.) [hereinafter Adler].
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individual to obey the law in violation of the precepts of his or her faith. This may
be because existing laws create few problems, or because not all laws are strictly
enforced in the face of religiously compelled behaviour. A likelier explanation
is that, as the vast majority of Canadians are still Christian,4 the laws created by
political majorities present few conflicts with the majority faith. Moreover, religion
itself has declined as a force in Canadian life: more than three million Canadians
say they have no religion at all, a figure that has doubled in the last decade.5 Thus,
few people are likely to take seriously religious commands that require them to
disobey the dictates of the state.
Indeed, we have built the notion of conflict between religion and the state into the
very language of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms.6 The preamble's
statement that "Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law [emphasis added],"7 stirring as it is, also reminds us that a
citizen may have two sources of obligation.
Nevertheless, it is essential that the role and limits of religious freedom be
clearly defined. Despite the lack of strong religious allegiances among many in
the Canadian mainstream, both the influx of immigrants of diverse religions and
the nation's policy of encouraging multiculturalism, as signalled by s. 27 of the
Charter,' suggest that more conflicts will arise in the future between the practices
of religious minorities and laws crafted by members of the majority. Furthermore,
as the reach of the administrative state extends ever further into every aspect of life,
the law is bound to disturb an increasing number of religious practicesf Though
a few useful discussions of these problems have appeared in the Canadian legal
literature, the scarcity of thorough attempts to confront the meaning of religious
freedom in Canada leaves us unprepared to deal with the conflicts that are sure to
arise with increasing frequency. 10
4. "[Flour out of five people report Christianity as their religion" in Canada. M. Campbell,
"Christmas in a secular society" The Globe and Mail (24 December 1994) Dl.
5. Ibid. Even among the Christian majority, church attendance has dipped from 60 percent after
World War II to 20 percent today. Ibid.
6. Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11
[hereinafter Charter].
7. Moreover, the presence of the word "God" in the preamble creates a tension with the presence in
the Charterof a guarantee of freedom of religion, as William Klassen points out: "To mention
God with a capital letter in the preamble to the Charter and then to go on to say that the Charter

provides a fundamental freedom of conscience and religion, is a contradiction which even a
theologian, to say nothing of all the lawyers, must surely recognize." W. Klassen, "Religion and

the Nation: An Ambiguous Alliance" (1991) 40 U.N.B. L.J. 87 at 95 [hereinafter "Religion and
the Nation"]. Klassen advocates the word's removal. Ibid. In O'Sullivan v. M.N.R., [1992] 1 P.C.
522 (T.D.), Muldoon J. suggests that this preamble merely "prevents the Canadian state from
becoming offically atheistic." Ibid. at 536. With respect, this seems like little more than an
attempt at rationalization, and is not supported by any convincing argument.

8. Supra note 6, s. 27.
9. See D. Laycock, "The Remnants of Free Exercise" [1990] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 68 ("Today, the
scope of pluralism and the scope of government are both vastly greater. The occasions on which
the normal government restricts religious exercise have multiplied manyfold").
10. The most prominent treatments of the subject so far are Weinrib, "Reading the Lesson," infra
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The project of illuminating the meaning and extent of religious freedom is even

more important because it is a way to answer questions whose import go beyond
the religious community: What should be the extent of the state's power? What
role should intermediary groups play in a liberal democracy? In particular, what
should be the role of religious groups in a society whose public dialogue is based

on the shared language of rationalism and liberalism? Must we all share the same
language to ensure a productive public discourse? Or is liberalism, too, no more
than another faith, another uncertain way of interpreting existence, and thus no
more entitled to the mantle of legitimacy and primacy than any other faith-based

claim?"
In the course of examining the role and limits of freedom of religion in a liberal
democracy, I wish to suggest that liberal democracy has in recent years often given
the wrong answer to those questions. In the United States, the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment have given rise to a rich but tangled jurisprudence on law
and religion, 2 which has, in recent years, resulted in a tendency to treat religion

as one of many mere 'choices' that individuals can make, an important part of
one's life but one that must give way to the encroachments of the administrative
in Stephen Carter's memorable phrase, a tendency to treat "religion
state-in short,
3

as a hobby."'

In Canada, a somewhat different problem presents itself. Though the major
cases dealing with freedom of religion have offered expansive definitions of the
freedom, the relative paucity of cases arising under the Charter's guarantee of
freedom of religion 4 means that the courts have not clearly defined the extent
of the limits on religious freedom. And in the cases that they have decided in
this area, the courts have as yet given inconsistent answers, largely because of an
note 62; Cotler, infra note 104; Macklem, infra note 89; and Black, infra note 39. In addition,
David M. Beatty provides an extended discussion of religious educational funding issues in
Talking Heads and the Supremes: The CanadianProductionof ConstitutionalReview, ch. 5
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990). Most of these discussions pre-date the considerable developments in
freedom of religion jurisprudence in the United States and Canada that have occurred in the last
five years. Macklem's piece, though useful, pre-dates all significant Charterjurisprudence on
freedom of religion. It is hoped that this article's attempt to discuss a substantial part of the
Canadian jurisprudence on s. 2(a) will provide both an analytical framework and a useful
jumping-off point for increased discussion of this topic.
11. See S. Fish, "Liberalism Doesn't Exist" [1987] Duke LJ. 997 at 997: "[L]iberalism is informed
by a faith (a word deliberately chosen) in reason as a faculty that operates independently of any
particular world view.... The one thing liberalism cannot do is put reason inside the battle
where it would have to contend with other adjudicative principles and where it could not succeed
merely by invoking itself because its own status would be what was at issue."
12. For a useful guide to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on freedom of religion, see C.H.
Esbeck, "Table of United States Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious Liberty
1789-1994" (1993-94) 10 J.L. & Religion 573.
13. See S.L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief"How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious
Devotion (New York: Anchor Books, 1994) at 29 [hereinafter Culture of DisbelieA;
"Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby" [1987] Duke L.J. 977.
14. Charter, supra note 6, s. 2:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion ...

Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion

incomplete understanding of the role and purpose of freedom of religion. One thing
is clear, however: as in the United States, Canadian courts have adopted a view
that favours the goals of the state over the obligations of religion, and that evaluates
limitations on freedom of religion from the viewpoint of a rational, secular actor.
To the degree that the state bases its decisions on a rational, liberal framework, the
qualities that make religion unique and valuable-its allegiance to the irrational and
the supematural'-will cause religious goals to be subordinated to statist goals.
I do not wish to demonize liberal democracy, which provides a strong environment for the of religious freedom of a fairly diverse number of faiths. I will argue,
however, that religion and liberal democracy represent two very different views of
human experience, 6 and their divergence leads to significant consequences for the
religious person in the liberal state. Ultimately, when religious adherents most need
the help (or at least non-interference) of the state, they may be least likely to receive
it.
In both the United States and Canada, I will suggest, the prevailing statist conception of liberalism guarantees that religion is seen as an important choice, but a
choice at best; where it conflicts with rationally conceived goals, it will lose. As
reasonable as this outcome may seem when viewed from the statist viewpoint, I
will suggest that it ultimately impairs and impoverishes the growth of a stronger
and more inclusive liberal state by remaining blind to religion's vital role as an
independent social force and a source of ideas from outside the liberal worldview.
This statist view relegates religion to the sphere of private action, when it should
respect and protect religion as an important public actor. Ultimately, if we understood religion's value and its role in society, we would be more willing to defer
to religious beliefs and practices, even where they conflict with the reasonable and
legitimate workings of the state.
In Part II of this article, I will attempt to provide working definitions of the
motive forces of this article: religion and liberal democracy. In Part II, I will briefly
outline the relationship between religion and the state in North America, focusing
on the pre-Charterhistory of freedom of religion in Canada and the conflicting
interpretations of the Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution. Part IV
will discuss the current liberal, statist approach to religion, which misunderstands
religion by viewing it largely as an individual, private act, and devalues it by
leaving it little room for participation in liberal discourse. In Part V, these findings
are applied to the current jurisprudence on freedom of religion in Canada and the
United States. They will show the rationalist bias in both countries' treatment of
15. Some religions or sects, it is true, construct highly rational, logic-based justifications for their
positions. But even the logical argument of an Aquinas is, at some level, rooted in beliefs or
premises that defy empirical proof or adopt extra-logical claims. Accordingly, though a religion
may take on the colour of rational discourse, its uniqueness may still, in large measure, relate to
its reliance on a supernatural source or an 'irrational' conclusion.
16. See C. Diamini, "Culture, Religion, and Education" in D. van Wyk, Rights and Constitutionalism:
The New South African Legal Order (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1994) at 593: "[R]eligion and
politics embrace in differing ways the whole of human life. Both religious movements and
political movements (or governments) hold their own views of what human beings.., should be."
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religion, particularly in areas where the importance of the state's claim leads the
courts to overlook how compelling religious claims may be to their adherents.
Finally, in Part VI, I will attempt to flesh out the role of religion in society and
its importance to the societal dialogue that is necessary for liberal democracy to
flourish. Having presented a clear picture of religion's value, I argue in Part VII that
the proper approach of the courts and the state to religion should be both supportive
and accommodating: offering general support to religion and accommodating it
where its obligations come into conflict with the law. While not all religious claims
will prevail over the claims of the state, the courts' approach should attempt to give
full weight to the value of religion both to society and to the adherent, and avoid
taking a strictly rational or statist view of religious claims. In the final result, it
will be shown that if the state shows a willingness to give way rather than impose
its laws, it will reap more in the long run from full religious participation in society
than it will lose; in short, it will ensure the progress of participation and dialogue
in a "free and democratic society."' 7
II. Definitions
A. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF RELIGION
The definition of what constitutes a religion, and thus when the right of freedom
of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter will apply, is a logical prerequisite to any
discussion of freedom of religion. But the term has been poorly defined in Canada
and presents recurring definitional difficulties in other countries.
In Big M, the most important case so far in Canadian freedom of religion jurisprudence, Dickson J. (as he then was) noted, "Religious belief and practice are
historically prototypical and, in many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously-held
beliefs and manifestations and are therefore protected by the Charter."" Perhaps
because the term "conscientiously-held beliefs" embraces both conscience and religion, which both find protection in s. 2(a) of the Charter,Dickson J. did not go
further to define religion itself. Ironically, the case that has most clearly defined
the scope of freedom of religion does little to indicate what sorts of conscientiously
held beliefs will be protected.
Though it may be impossible to devise a perfect definition of religion, 19 a more

17. Charter, supra note 6, s. 1: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedons guarantees the rights

and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." See also L.E. Weinrib, "The Supreme
Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter" (1988) 10 Supreme Court L.R. 469 (arguing
that both Charter rights and s. 1 should be applied to forward the values and ideals of a free and
democratic society).
18. Big M, supra note 2 at 361-62.
19. See G.C. Freeman III, "The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 'Religion'"
(1983) 71 Geo. L.J. 1519.
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substantial working definition is necessary.2" A clear definition will ease any uncertainty on the part of the courts. It will also remove the possibility that individual
judges will craft biased definitions of religion that reflect a majoritarian skepticism
about the claims of religious adherents whose beliefs and practices do not resemble
the tenets of mainstream religions. As Tarnopolsky J.A. noted in R. v. ideoflicks,
all religions require their adherents to observe the tenets of that religion by various
practices which would appear to others to have a purely secular significance, such as
not cutting one's hair and wearing turbans, or shaving one's head and wearing saffron
robes, such as not eating certain foods or eating them on certain days and not others,
such as not killing certain animals or consuming some and not others and, above all,
such as not working or buying or selling goods or services on certain days specified
as the sabbath. 2'
Tarnopolsky J.A.'s statement applies to beliefs as well as to practices: what may
seem to the adherent to be a binding tenet of a spiritual faith, entitling that person to
the protection of the Charter,may seem to another to be a purely secular philosophy
or even a fraudulent or absurd claim. This is particularly true given the myriad faiths
other than mainstream denominations such as Christianity, Judaism, or Islam that are
now represented in the Canadian population.' Accordingly, a proper definition is
called for. Moreover, Videoflicks suggests that the relative breadth of the definition
of religion may affect whether the right is limited by definition, or by matters
such as the sincerity or importance of the belief. Beyond prudential considerations,
however, the courts must have a proper definition of religion because they do not
make their rulings in a vacuum; they constitute an influential social institution,
whose influence makes itself felt beyond the confines of the law and whose rhetoric
may become part of a citizen's social vocabulary. As Winnifred Fallers Sullivan
notes,
How the courts talk about religion is critical, because the texture of the public discourse
about religion creates a culture about religion. People's lives are given meaning in
the spaces created by words. If the courts distort.., religion when they talk about2 it,
they both do violence to peoples' experiences and undermine their own authority. 3
20. See P.E. Johnson, "Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine" (1984) 72
Cal. L. Rev. 817 at 839: "How can we say anything about religion if we do not know what it is?"
21. R. v. Videoflicks (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 10 at 36 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd in part EdwardsBooks, supra
note 2.
22. See L. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, 2d. ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988) at
1179 ("Religion in America, always pluralistic, has become radically so in the latter part of the
twentieth century"). The same forces-immigration and the growth of political pluralism and
multiculturalism-that have led to an increase in the number of religions in the United States
have, of course, also affected Canada. Thus, M.H. Ogilvie notes that according to the 1991
Census, Canada was home to 84 recorded religious minorities, as well as those faiths that were
not recorded and those individuals with no religious faith. M.H. Ogilvie, "Overcoming 'The
Culture of Disbelief " (1995) 29 L. Soc. Gaz. 105 at 118.
23. W.F. Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United
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Of central importance to the shaping of a definition of religion in the United
States Constitution's Religion Clauses24 has been the absence of a clause with
respect to freedom of conscience. Accordingly, at least with respect to cases under
the Free Exercise Clause," the definition of religion has embraced a broad range

of beliefs. Thus, in United States v. Seeger,2 6 a case involving an application for
a statutory exemption from military service based on religious belief, Clark J. held
that a definition of a "belief in relation to a Supreme Being" includes any belief that

takes "a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief

in God of one who clearly qualifies for this exemption."'27 In another conscientious
objector case, Welsh v. United States,2 8 a similar statute was held to apply to "all
those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,
would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of
29

an instrument of war."
Of the two cases, it is Seeger's definition that, for all its breadth, appears to retain
a requirement of spiritual belief. This definition will be of more aid to Canadian
courts, since the Charter right of freedom of conscience is separately guaranteed

and need not be implied in the guarantee of religious freedom. Indeed, even in the
United States the Court has attempted to retain a spiritual component, notwithstanding the statutory interpretation in Welsh; this is appropriate, since most claims of
conscience can be addressed under the Speech and Association Clauses of the First

Amendment.3" The Court considered the issue specifically in Wisconsin v. Yoder,31
a case granting a religion-based exemption. There, the Court ruled that claims
based on "subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority '32 -that is, simple philosophical rejections of the social

norm-are not valid freedom of religion claims.33 Similarly, the values of pluralism

States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 163.
24. U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The two halves of this guarantee are commonly
referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
25. See R.J. Araujo, "A Dialogue Between the Church and Caesar: A Contemporary Interpretation of
the Religion Clauses" (1993) 34 B.C. L. Rev. 493 at 500: "Commentators have generally agreed
that the definition of religion for each [clause] is different. In the context of the Establishment
Clause, the definition tends to be narrow, whereas for Free Exercise claims it normally is much
broader." See also Tribe, supranote 22 at 1186 (acknowledging and criticizing the dual definition
approach).
26. 380 U.S. 163 (1964).
27. Ibid. at 166.
28. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
29. Ibid. at 344. See also Re Civil Service Assn. of Ont. (Inc.) and Anderson (1976), 60 D.L.R. (3d)
397 at 400 (Ont. H.C.J.), per Morden J. (religion may include that which is held to be of ultimate
importance). For a criticism of the Welsh decision as overbroad, see D.N. Feofanov, "Defining
Religion: An Immodest Proposal" (1994), 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 309 at 367-74.
30. U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech., or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble...
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Ibid. at 216.
33. For an application, see e.g. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the
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and multiculturalism that are prominent in Canadian law and society appear at first
to suggest the need for a broad definition of religion that encompasses faiths that
do not resemble the mainstream religions. It should be remembered, however, that
deep-seated beliefs that are not identifiably religious will find protection under the
freedom of conscience guarantee, which is also part of s. 2, or under other sections
of the Charter.Therefore, too broad an approach to the definition of religion should
34
be avoided.
At the other extreme is a narrow definition that focuses on particular requirements-requirements that bear a strong resemblance to traits that are central to
mainstream religions. Thus, in R. v. Registrar General;Ex parte Segerdal, s Lord
Denning M.R. defined a place of worship as one in which
people come together as a congregation or assembly to do reverence to God. It need
not be the God which the Christians worship.
It may be another God, or an unknown
36
God, but it must be reverence to a deity.
Under this definition, a Scientologists' meeting place was found not to be a place of
worship. Similarly, warning that "the mantle of immunity would soon be in tatters
if it were wrapped around beliefs, practices and observances of every kind whenever
a group of adherents chose to call themselves a religion," the Australian High Court
in Re Church of New Faith37 set a definition of religion that requires "belief in a
supernatural Being, Thing or Principle" and "the acceptance of canons of conduct
in order to give effect to that belief";3" in this instance, the Court accepted the
Scientologists' claim of religious status. While limiting religion in this way may
be beneficial, inasmuch as it clearly protects those with spiritual obligations while
excluding mere personal philosophy, the danger of a narrow definition is that it
may encourage an "ethnocentric definition" based on the majority's views of what
constitutes religion.39
Another possible approach to a definition of religion emphasizes its communal
aspects.4" Thus, Stephen Carter, suggesting that religious communities as a whole
may end up in conflict with the state, takes the following as a working definition
of religion:

claim of MOVE, a revolutionary political organization, that it is religious).
See Tribe, supra note 22 at 1183.
[1970] 3 All E.R. 886.
Ibid. at 889-90.
(1983) 49 A.L.R. 65.
Ibid. at 74. Wilson and Deane JJ., concurring in the result, adopted a less strict test, listing
several criteria as indicia of whether a belief or group is religious. Ibid. at 106.
39. See W.W. Black, "Religion and the Right of Equality" in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds.,
Equality Rights and the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at
134.
40. See e.g. M. McConnell, "Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses" (1986) 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 146
at 159: "Religious experience typically is communal and institutional, not individualistic."

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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a tradition of group worship (as against individual metaphysic) that presupposes the
existence of a sentience beyond the human and capable of acting outside of the observed
principles and limits of natural41science, and, further, a tradition that makes demands
of some kind on its adherents.
Carter is right to stress that religious groups are poorly dealt with by the state, which
is accustomed to treating rights as individually held rather than communally held,
A group emphasis can, however, have unfortunate results. In the recent decision
in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman,42 Adams J. upheld (while limiting the
scope of) an injunction against picketing outside hospitals and clinics that performed
abortions. One defendant claimed the injunction violated her s. 2(a) rights, because
her actions were "motivated by her religious faith." 43 Notwithstanding that Carter's
definition is merely a working definition for the sake of a book dealing substantially
with group behaviour, Justice Adams cited Carter for the proposition that "the
concept of religion connotes the beliefs of a group."' 41 Justice Adams continued:
If [the defendant's] belief that her protest activity is required by her religion is not
shared by the vast majority of the members of her religion, which is the case, it is
that her conduct constitutes the exercise, practice or manifestation
difficult to conclude
45
of her religion.
With respect, this is unpersuasive and unsettling reasoning. Dissentience within
religious communities is a common phenomenon that both renews and challenges
old faiths and leads to the creation of new ones. One need only recall the example
of Martin Luther to understand that the doctrinal orthodoxy of one's beliefs is not
a true index of their legitimacy or sincerity. 46 While the courts should be aware of
the corporate nature of many religious communities in order to give full meaning
to the guarantee of freedom of religion, they should not define religion to reinforce
the same tyranny of the majority that led to the s. 2(a) right in the first place.
I would propose that the following criteria be viewed as minimal criteria for a
claim to fall under the guarantee of freedom of religion: (i) a belief that is spiritual,
supernatural or transcendent in nature, whether or not it is shared by anyone else,
so long as it is sincerely held; (ii) the belief is best served or honoured by certain
behaviour, whether individually or in a group; (iii) if the behaviour is not actually
compelled by the belief, it should be part of the regular practice of a group of
common faith-holders.
41. Culture of Disbelief supra note 13 at 17.
42. (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229 (Gen. Div.).
43. Ibid. at 331.

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 at 715 (1981) for a preferable approach: "Intrafaith
differences ... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process
is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses."
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These criteria are broad insofar as they embrace both individual and group practice, and recognize the importance of behaviour that is suggested by religious belief,
and not just behaviour that is religiously compelled. Still, the scope of the criteria
will be limited by two aspects. First, the requirement of a belief in a supernatural
or spiritual authority separates such beliefs from claims of conscience and gives
weight to the religious adherent's view that he or she is bound by something higher
than temporal authority. In many faiths the adherent may face extratemporal consequences if he or she obeys the temporal authority of the state-a dilemma that
merits the state's respect. Thus, Jesse Choper has suggested that the definition
of religion for the purpose of Free Exercise Clause claims in the United States
must include the requirement that "violation of those beliefs entails extratemporal
consequences."'47 The idea of extratemporal consequences must be broadly applied.
Those who do not believe in such concepts as damnation, for example, may still
be included under this definition if their faith favours some actions and disfavours
others; this qualification would embrace any religion with a strongly held system of
ethics or a concept of karma or spiritual balance. If so applied, this definition may
be a useful signpost to courts seeking to define a belief or practice as religious.
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Macintosh offered this definition:
"The essence of religion is a belief in a relation to God involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation."48 If the reference to God is omitted (a
reference suggesting a view of religion that accords with mainstream Western faiths
but excludes faiths such as Buddhism), a useful definitional concept is revealed: the
idea of a superior duty stemming from an individual's relationship with spiritual
or transcendent forces. Such a definition retains the idea that the law should give
way because the religious adherent must obey a spiritual duty, but still embraces a
broad and pluralistic view of religious faith.
Second, an individual'sfreedom of religion claim must be based on compulsion
rather than mere preference-a distinction that narrows the scope of individual
claims and eases the courts' obligation to give way to any individually stated ethical
preference. While a very limited number of individuals may be prejudiced by this
requirement, it will drastically limit the opportunity for some individuals to advance
fraudulent claims to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, since the
prior or subsequent failure to perform any 'compelled' practice will be a strong
indication of an insincere claim. At the same time, this requirement recognizes
that some practices may be essential to the vitality of a religious community, and
thus worthy of protection, even though the practices are not actually compelled by
47. J.H. Choper, Securing Religious Liberty: Principlesfor JudicialInterpretationof the Religion
Clauses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) at 54. However, I would disagree with
Choper's justification for this requirement-that "obeying the law at the price of perceived eternal
repercussions produces substantially greater psychological suffering than does doing so at the cost
of compromising scruples with only temporal reactions." Ibid. at 86. Rather, I would emphasize
the importance of the potential severity of the extratemporal consequences, and the state's
inability to evaluate claims, such as a claim that an act would lead to damnation, which are
grounded in non-rational understandings of experience.
48. 283 U.S. 605 at 633-34 (1931).
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threat of extratemporal consequences. In this way, even those faith communities
that do not retain Western concepts of duty or obligation but that do involve a web
of spiritually related cultural practices will find protection under the umbrella of
religious freedom.
It should be noted that even broad definitions of religious freedom can be unduly
limited by rules of application. Thus, in R. v. Videoflicks, Tarnopolsky J.A. wrote
that freedom of religion
also includes the right to observe the essential practices demanded by the tenets of
one's religion and, in determining what those essential practices are in any given
case, the analysis must proceed not from the majority's perspective of the concept of
religion but in terms of the role that the practices and beliefs assume in the religion of
the individual or group concerned.49 [emphasis added]
Thus, under this approach, a practice that is not essential to one's religious practices
may fall outside the scope of the guarantee. Though the court clearly states that the
test of what is essential should be made from the perspective of the faith-holder,
the rule can be used to justify a searching, even invasive scrutiny of a religious
group's practice.5 0 Of course, whether or not a belief is essential, it can be argued
that "each individual should be afforded the maximum opportunity for emotional
'
and spiritual development."51
Accordingly, a more appropriate approach would not focus on how essential a
religious practice is, but would simply ask: Is the claim related to the individual
or group's religious behaviour? The court may use a justification test to limit a
right in a number of ways. But, when the court asks initially whether a right has
been infringed, a practice that relates to the spiritual tenets of a person or group,
essential or not, should be viewed as distinctly religious. 2
49. R. v. Videoflicks, supra note 21 at 35.
50. See Salvation Army, CanadaEast v. Ontario (A.G.) (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 238 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.

Div.)). In this (in my view) unfortunate decision, Henry J., following a searching inquiry,
ultimately discounted the testimony of leading officers in the Salvation Army that the application
of the Pension Benefits Act would violate an important religious principle, that of voluntariness.
Henry J. called the evidence led by these officers "apologia for the views of the hierarchy and...
formalistic and technical ... rather than rooted in the fundamental doctrines of the faith." He
added: "This dedication of body and soul to the religious life and mission as reflected in the
religious, Le., non-secular tenets of the Army, cannot in all logic and sincerity be affected by the
question whether retirement allowances under a pension plan are gratuitous and discretionary, or
are legally or contractually guaranteed.... [T]o say that the officers stand in a voluntary
relationship to their supervisors is patently not realistic." Ibid. at 282-83. The value of
-illuminating religious belief by inquiring as to its logic or realism is questionable.
51. Black, supra note 39 at 135; but see ibid. at 135-36.
52. Nevertheless, not every practice of a religious group is a religious practice. Some courts are too
forgiving in this regard. See e.g. Powell v. Stafford, 859 F.Supp. 1343 (D.Colo. 1994)
(application of age discrimination statute in termination of Catholic high school teacher violates
Religion Clauses despite absence of religious considerations in dismissal); Gabriel v. Inmanuel
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 640 N.E.2d 681 (lll.App.4.Dist. 1994) (breach of contract suit
against church is an ecclesiastical matter despite absence of religious reasons for breach); Dlaikan
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B.

LIBERALISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Equally as important as a definition of religion is a reasonable working definition of
liberalism and liberal democracy, since these are the forces that act on religion in
the modern Western state. I will not attempt to define liberalism in detail, since that
elusive goal is better suited to a work of pure philosophy. Still, it may be useful
to isolate and describe certain familiar and common elements of liberal democracy,
whose presence will be clear in the jurisprudence of freedom of religion. 3
Robert J. Sharpe has identified three central premises of liberalism: its belief
in the "intrinsic and ultimate worth of the human individual"; its view of the
state's role as "maximizing human dignity, self-fulfillment and autonomy, while
minimizing interferences with individual moral choice"; and its belief that "the
state and the law should be neutral as to particular conceptions of the good life."'54
In addition to noting these values, John Gray adds that liberalism is egalitarian,
in that it "confers on all men the same moral status," and universalist, in that it
affirms "the moral unity of the human species and accord[s] a secondary importance
to specific historic associations."55 Liberalism can be understood in terms of the
values it raises in opposition to foreign value systems: "reason versus affect, free
choice versus conditioning, individual liberty versus social will."56
It is clear that certain liberal values adumbrated above-for instance, individualism, egalitarianism, rationalism, and the exaltation of the species over any "historic
associations"-may conflict with religious values. What, then, of liberalism's 'neutrality'? Does this concept not offer a safe haven for religious values? The answer
to this question seems to be that liberalism's claims to value-neutrality are hollow.
Liberal states, Joseph Raz suggests, "reject the idea that the state has a right to
impose a conception of the good on its inhabitants. . . ."5 As Charles Taylor has
pointed out, however, "Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures;
it is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with

v. Roodbeen, 522 N.W.2d 719 at 720-21, per Taylor, J., dissenting (Mich.App. 1994) (suit
against Catholic school is ecclesiastical matter): "[B]y its unwarranted and unwise expansion of
the ecclesiastical exception provided by the Free Exercise Clause, the majority has created a
jurisprudential black hole in which the exception swallows the rule."
53. It is interesting to remember that the development of liberalism is itself closely tied to the
question of religious belief. See W.A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity
in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 13: "Liberalism may be
said to have originated in an effort to disentangle politics and religion. It has culminated in what
I see as a characteristic liberal incapacity to understand religion."
54. R.J. Sharpe, "New Ways of Thinking-Liberalism" in F.E. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge
Lectures 1991 (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1993) at 265-66.
55. J. Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) at x.
56. N.M. Stolzenberg, "'He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out': Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the
Paradox of a Liberal Education" (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 at 586.
57. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 108.
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other ranges.... Liberalism is also a fighting creed."58 At the very least, liberalism's focus on the autonomous individual, and on the maximization of individual
conceptions of the good, tends to give it in practice an emphasis on freedom over
tradition, will over obligation, and individual over community. In the context of
liberal democracy, in which the liberal state seeks to maximize happiness among a
diverse number of groups, and thus seeks some form of common ground, a further
tendency is often seen: the tendency to understand the state and its concept of the
good through rational terms, and to deal best with those claims grounded in rational
argument.
One additional element must be considered in the working definition of liberal
democracy: the growth of statism. Not a concrete political philosophy, statism may
be characterized as an approach to democratic governance that exalts the goals of
the modern administrative state, viewing the state's democratically arrived at and
rationally justified goals as central to social order and well-being-in other words,
a philosophy that represents the primacy of "good government." Since statist goals
are grounded in rationalist terms and liberal principles, they may conflict with nonrational private preferences such as religious beliefs. Thus, the statist goal of a
well-ordered system of universal public education may be confounded by claims
favouring the establishment and funding of separate schools to cater to religious
communities; and statist arguments in favour of medical care for children, grounded
as they are in liberal notions of autonomy and rational arguments in favour of
corporeal existence, will dismiss as irrational and monstrous those claimants who
advance religious arguments against medical intervention.
In fairness, it must be acknowledged that there may be said to be many different
forms of liberalism, ranging from the "procedural liberalism" which most resembles
the individualistic, rational, neutral philosophy I take for my general definition, to
those forms of liberalism that emphasize the communitarian aspects of citizenship
and are more willing to acknowledge and work toward social goals.59 There is no
doubt, however, that while the academic understanding of liberalism may be undergoing revision, the popular understanding of liberalism and liberal goals continues
to exert great influence in the public sphere. In particular, my definition of liberal
democracy must be understood in the context of the modern administrative state,
which reinforces such classical liberal values as rationalism and procedural equality
and fairness.
In short, these values may be taken to represent the most common elements of
statist liberal democracy. Though this working definition is vastly simplified, these
values will be evident throughout our examination of the treatment of religion in a
liberal democracy.
58. C. Taylor, PhilosophicalArguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 249.
See also Galston, supra note 53 at 3: "Nor can the liberal state be properly understood as
,neutral' in any of the senses in which that term is currently employed. Like every other political
community, it embraces a view of the human good that favors certain ways of life and tilts

against others."
59. See Taylor, ibid. at 181-203.
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II. The History of Church-State Conflict in North America
Though the content of the guarantee of religious freedom under the Chartercannot
be bound by history, an understanding of the role and limits of s. 2(a) may be
enriched by an examination of the historical basis of freedom of religion, and of
the extent to which the guarantee has been provided or respected in the past, both in
Canada and in the United States. The language in s. 2 may declare the fundamental
freedom of religion in "ringing terms, ' 60 yet the words will be frustratingly vague
unless an understanding of the context in which the right was granted breathes life
into the language. And so, in Big M, Dickson J. (as he then was) recommends an
analysis of the right
by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language
chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historicaloriginsof the concepts
enshrined,and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. 61 [emphasis
added]
It has been suggested that carrying out an analysis of the historical roots of the
Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution may be a snare for the unwary:
Since protection of religious freedom is the prototypical right, and since the American
jurisprudence is so readily accessible and superficially intelligible, it is tempting to
search it for answers to Charter questions. But this search must be carried out with
caution lest it carry back to Canada presuppositions rooted in the particularity of
American experience, as interpreted or misinterpreted by the United States Supreme
62
Court, and import the contradictions of American doctrine which follow thereupon.
With this caveat in mind, I would contend that an examination of the history
of freedom of religion in the United States is both necessary and beneficial to the
understanding of freedom of religion in Canada, for a number of reasons. First,
American jurisprudence is unquestionably useful, both for an understanding of the
role of religion in a liberal democracy and for a specific analysis of the content of
s. 2(a); accordingly, it is necessary to appreciate the historical roots of the American
jurisprudence, in order to see both its virtues and its flaws more clearly. Second, as
Canadian society becomes increasingly pluralistic, the development of freedom of
religion in the United States, which from its inception has been home to a profusion
of religious sects, will be increasingly instructive. Third, despite our differences,
60. Big M, supra note 2 at 359.
61. Ibid. at 359-60 [emphasis added].
62. L.E. Weinrib, "The Religion Clauses: Reading the Lesson" (1986) 8 Supreme Court L.R. 507 at
511-12 [hereinafter "Reading the Lesson"]. This alarm is particularly apt with regard to the
Establishment Clause, which lacks a direct parallel in the Charter,but is somewhat less pressing
with regard to the Free Exercise Clause.
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Canadian and American courts have often achieved similar results in freedom of
religion cases, and any effort to find out why (and whether) that should be is
worthwhile.6 3 Finally, the sheer volume of American history and jurisprudence on
freedom of religion, while it may not be a controlling influence on the development
of Canadian jurisprudence, may fill a void left by a much smaller body of literature
and jurisprudence on that subject in Canada.
A. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Given the heated nature of the disputes among those with differing interpretations of
the historical origins of the Religion Clauses, it seems safe to say only that the more
attention that is devoted to the topic, the less certainty there is about the proper way
to read the intentions of the framers of the Constitution with respect to freedom of
religion. As Thomas Curry notes, "The opposing sides [in the interpretive battle]
have tangled in heated engagements, but have now settled into a kind of trench
warfare."' Leonard Levy, perhaps the best-known historian of the First Amendment, observed that the Establishment Clause, "like any other controversial clause
of the Constitution, is sufficiently ambiguous in language and history to allow few
''
sure generalizations."
Perhaps one reason the debate over the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses
has been so heated is that, until recently, the attention has been focused almost exclusively on the Establishment Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause.66 This narrower
approach, in my view, has led scholars to focus disproportionately on the limits
of religious influence in the state, and ignore the question of the desirable extent
of religious freedom; in turn, this has caused a reluctance to give full credence to
the Free Exercise Clause. At the same time, Establishment Clause interpretation
has itself been constrained-by the force of a 200-year-old metaphor with a powerful grip on the judicial and historical imagination: the metaphor of a "wall of
separation" between church and state.67
63. See R.A. Sedler, "The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion, Expression, and

Association in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis" (1988) 20 Case. W.Res.
J.Int'l. L. 577 at 588-89 (citing cases).

64. T.J. Curry, The FirstFreedoms: Church and State in America to the Passageof the First

Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at vii.
65. L.W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the FirstAmendment (New York: Macmillan

Publishing Co., 1986) at xiv. For a critique of the often careless attempts at historical research
and analysis made by lawyers, judges and legal academics, see M.S. Flaherty, "History 'Lite' in
Modem American Constitutionalism" (1995) 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 at 523-26. He writes:
[Constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic
and at worse, howlers." Ibid. at 525.
66. See M. McConnell, "The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion"
(1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 at 1413-14 [hereinafter "Origins of Free Exercise"]. For
criticisms of this article's historical conclusions, see P.A. Hamburger, "A Constitutional Right of
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective" (1992) 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915.
67. For judicial criticism of the dominant influence of the wall of separation, see e.g. McCollum v.
Boardof Education, 333 U.S. 203 at 247 (1948) (Reed J.dissenting) ("A rule of law should not
be drawn from a figure of speech"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 at 2516 (1985)
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As has been noted elsewhere,6" the wall of separation metaphor was suggested,
with radically different meanings, by two figures from the Revolutionary period:
Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson. Williams's use of the metaphor, as Mark DeWolfe Howe noted, stemmed from a "dread of the worldly corruptions which might
69
consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained";
in other words, he urged separation as a way to protect the church, not the state.
Conversely, Jefferson's use of the metaphor, in a letter to the Baptists of Danbury, Conn., has been taken as a product of "the skepticism and the confidence
of the Enlightenment."70 These, then, are the polar opposites of Religion Clause
interpretation, and particularly Establishment Clause interpretation: either the First
Amendment was erected as a rationalist, Enlightenment project to guard against
any religious influence over the state,71 or it was intended more as a protection of
religious diversity and guard against a single
the church from the state, to protect
72
national religious establishment.
This interpretive struggle has played itself out in the courts, most notably in two
Supreme Court decisions that have attempted to provide historical justifications for
two opposing jurisprudential approaches to the Religion Clauses. The first approach
was seen in Everson v. Board of Education,73 a 1947 decision dealing with a New
Jersey statute that reimbursed parents for the use of publicly operated buses to
transport their children to school; the statute was challenged because it allowed
busing to parochial schools as well as public schools. Writing for the majority,
Black J. relied largely on the early experience in Virginia to describe religious
freedom in the United States as a right born of

68.

69.
70.

71.

72.
73.

(Rehnquist, J. dissenting): "The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be
frankly and explicitly abandoned."
See e.g. M.D. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American
ConstitutionalHistory (Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1965) [hereinafter Garden and Wilderness];
Weinrib, "Reading the Lesson," supra note 62.
Garden and Wilderness, ibid. at 6.
Ibid. at 7. Jefferson wrote: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of
separation between church and state." Ibid. at 1. See also S.G. Gey, "Why is Religion Special?
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment" (1990) 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75 at 79: "The establishment clause should be viewed as
a reflection of the secular, relativist political values of the Enlightenment, which are incompatible
with the fundamental nature of religious faith."
See e.g. Gey, ibid.; P.B. Kurland, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court" (1961) 29
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 at 3 (noting the "large number of unbelievers in the community that inserted
these guarantees into the Constitution"); W.V. Alstyne, "Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly" [1984] Duke L.J. 770; L.W.
Levy, ConstitutionalOpinions: Aspects of the Bill of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986) at 135-70.
See e.g. Garden and Wilderness, supra note 68; "Reading the Lesson," supra note 62.
330 U.S. 1 (1947) [hereinafter Everson].
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the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a governor
ment which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any
74
all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.
Black emphasized the need for absolute separation:
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. 75
Everson's influence has extended far past the facts of the case, in which, in the end,
the Court upheld the program against an Establishment Clause claim, relying on
the fact that the statute granted its benefits to any child. Notwithstanding the result,
the decision's strong language and historical interpretation of the First Amendment
has formed the basis of a subsequent judicial view that the Religion Clauses made
the state a secular preserve.76
The opposing view of history on the Court was advanced by Rehnquist J.(as
he then was) in his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, a decision striking
down an Alabama statute that provided a moment of silence in the schools for
'
"meditation or voluntary prayer."77
Noting Everson's Jeffersonian interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, he complained:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding
been expressly
of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has
78
freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.
Rehnquist J.argued instead that the Establishment Clause was intended merely
to prevent the advancement of particular sects and the adoption of any one faith
as a national religion. He based his argument substantially on his emphasis on
another framer of the Constitution-James Madison-and on 79evidence of religious,
if non-sectarian, behaviour sanctioned by the First Congress.
Is either of these warring interpretations demonstrably more correct than the
other? In my view, both suffer for their focus on the Establishment Clause, since
a proper understanding of each clause depends on an interpretation that takes both
74. Ibid. at 11.
75. Ibid. at 18.
76. See e.g. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982). See also Everson, ibid., Jackson J. dissenting: "[The Establishment
Clause] was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's
hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life."
77. Wallace v. Jaffree, supra note 67 at 2481.

78. Ibid. at 2508.
79. Ibid. at 2511-14. More recently, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct.
2510 (1995) (permitting the University of Virginia to aid a religious publication through its

general subsidy of printing costs for student publications), Thomas and Souter JJ. have joined
battle on the historical interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
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clauses into account. On one point, Rehnquist J. certainly is correct: a narrow
focus on Jefferson's intent distorts a proper view of the Religion Clauses. It is
true that Jefferson's outlook was substantially influenced by the skepticism of the
Enlightenment; 0 but Jefferson was one of many leading figures in the creation of
the Constitution, and his views were not necessarily either universal or controlling,
as Michael McConnell has pointed out.8
Rehnquist J. is also right to point to Madison. Madison's emphasis on pluralism
is the missing ingredient in First Amendment history, and perhaps the most pertinent
point for Canadians, for whom pluralism is a constitutional dictate,82 to take from
the interpretive debates in American constitutional history. 3 Madison expressed his
interest in pluralism thus:
In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious
rights. It consists in the84one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, on
the multiplicity of sects.
Where Rehnquist J. errs, however, is in his failure to recognize that the Madisonian
imperative of pluralism may have an impact on the Establishment Clause, both at
a national and a state level,85 given the multiplicity of sects and interests that may
now be found in our polyglot society. 6
Thus, an appropriate modem reading of the Religion Clauses should recognize
the state's interest in encouraging religious liberty and pluralism (thus departing
from the essentially secularist view of Everson), while recognizing that in such a
80. See e.g. M.D. Peterson, "Jefferson and Religious Freedom" The Atlantic Monthly (December
1994) 112.
81. See McConnell, "Origins of Free Exercise," supra note 66 at 1517: "Locke and Jefferson may
well have been animated ... by the freedom from conformity to religious dogma. But that is not
what the Baptists, Quakers, Lutherans, and Presbyterians who provided the political muscle for
religious freedom in America had in mind."
82. Charter,supra note 6, s. 27: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."
83. For scholarship emphasizing the importance of pluralism in understanding the Religion Clauses,
see McConnell, "Origins of Free Exercise," supra note 66; Laycock, "The Remnants of Free
Exercise," supra note 9 at 68; G.V. Bradley, "Dogmatomachy-A 'Privatization' Theory of the
Religion Clause Cases" (1986) 30 St. Louis U. L.J. 275 at 276 [hereinafter "Dogmatomachy"]:
"This, of course, is the startling feature of our Constitution-its muteness on the centripetal force
essential to its operation. Thus, the high-stakes constitutional gamble explained by Madison
hoped to achieve manageable conflict fueled by diversity and freedom, instead of a politically
molded national community of similarly minded men and women."
84. A. Hamilton, J. Jay & J. Madison, The FederalistPapers, ed. Garry Wills (New York: Bantam
Books, 1982) (1788) at 264.
85. See Cantvell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (using Fourteenth Amendment to apply Free
Exercise Clause to states); Everson, supra note 73 (Fourteenth Amendment used to apply
Establishment Clause to states).
86. And not just 'now'; even in the Revolutionary era, according to one writer, the American
colonies were home to more than 3,000 religious organizations. See L. Underkuffler-Freund,
"The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment
Theory" (1995) 36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 837 at 846.
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radically pluralistic age, establishment at the federal or state level is an entirely
untenable form of state preference for a single group.8 7
B. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Literature on the history of religious freedom in Canada presents far more unanimity
of opinion than is to be found in the United States, but far less detail. The two
nations do share a popular view that the birth of religious freedom on the new
continent stems from dissentience and from the intolerance encountered in their
European roots. In attempting to illuminate the roots of religious freedom in Big
M, Dickson J. discussed the view, formulated as a reaction to establishmentarian
practices in England, that
belief itself was not amenable to compulsion. Attempts to compel belief or practice
denied the reality of individual conscience and dishonoured the God that had planted it
in His creatures. It is from these antecedents that the concepts of freedom of religion
and freedom of conscience became associated, to form, as they do in s. 2(a) of our
88
Charter, the single integrated concept of "freedom of conscience and religion."
Religious freedom and tolerance were at least paid lip-service long before the
advent of the Charter, in provincial and federal legislation. For example, the
Freedom of Worship Act 9 guaranteed "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference." Similarly, an act
amending the Public Schools Acts in British Columbia stressed the importance of a
87. For similar views, see McConnell, "Origins of Free Exercise," supra note 66 at 1516 ("The Court
should not ask, 'Will this advance religion?,' but rather, 'Will this advance religious
pluralism?' "); Weinrib, "Reading the Lesson," supra note 62 at 513-14 (arguing for a "liberty
component for the religion clauses"). In a recent book, Steven D. Smith has offered another
interpretive suggestion: that there is no satisfactory, cohesive way to understand the Religion
Clauses. See S.D. Smith, ForeordainedFailure: The Questfor a ConstitutionalPrinciple of

Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Smith argues that our search for
a consistent principle of religious freedom has led us to twist the meanings of the Religion
Clauses, which in reality are of limited power and "have nothing of substance to say on questions
of religious freedom." Ibid. at 16. Smith argues against an attempt to build a theory of religious
freedom, and in favour of a "prudential," more circumstance-based approach to religious freedom
cases.
88. Big M, supra note 2 at 361. Dickson J.'s analysis may be misleading, however. See J.W. Grant,
The Church in the CanadianEra, rev. ed. (Burlington, Ont.: Welch Publishing, 1988) at 11:
"The early settlers of Canada came, almost without exception, for reasons other than religious."
89. (1850-51), 14 & 15 Vict., c. 175 (Canada). Noted in P. Macklem, "Freedom of Conscience and
Religion in Canada" (1984) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 50 at 54; B. Laskin, "Freedom of Religion and the
Lord's Day Act-The Canadian Bill of Rights and the Sunday Bowling Case" (1964) 42 Can.
Bar. Rev. 147 at 156.
90. Essentially the same legislation remains on the books in Ontario: the Religious Freedom Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. R-22, consists of a preamble and one section, which guarantees "ihe free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
provided the same be not made an excuse for acts of licentiousness, or a justification of practices
inconsistent with the peace and safety of the Province."
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secular, non-dogmatic education as early as 1876.91 It was, of course, the subject
of a guarantee in the CanadianBill of Rights, 1960.92 Thus, Rand J. could state in
Saumur v. City of Quebec,93 in ruling that a Quebec by-law had the improper effect
of banning the religious solicitation activities of Jehovah's Witnesses:
From 1760, therefore, to the present moment religious freedom has, in our legal system, been recognized as a principle of fundamental character; and although we have
nothing in the nature of an established church, that the untrammelled affirmations of
religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional, remain as of the greatest
94
constitutional significance throughout the Dominion is unquestionable.
Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that long after the English settlers'
escape from Continental intolerance, and as recently as the latter part of this century,
"Religious inequality has played an all too important part in Canadian history." 95 In
the course of Canadian history, Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses and Hutterites, among
other groups, have been victims of religious discrimination.96 Those guarantees
encoded in law before the Charter were often not applied to grant the protection
that was needed.'
Of equal concern in the history of Canadian religious freedom has been the fact
that, as Lacourci~re J.A. has noted, "there is no firm wall between church and state
in Canada."9" Instead, the state has accorded special support to selected faiths, in
the separate school education guarantees for Catholic and Protestant communities
granted in the Constitution Act, 1867.91 The minority religious education rights
granted therein may have represented a "protection of minority rights" at the time
91. An Act to amend and consolidate the Public Schools Acts, C.S.B.C. 1877, c. 140, s. 40; noted in

92.
93.
94.
95.

Russow v. British Columbia (A.G.) (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 98 at 102-03 (B.C.S.C.).
S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1(c).
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
Ibid. at 327.
Black, supra note 39 at 131. See also The Hon. Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin, "Who
Owns Our Kids? Education, Health and Religion in a Multicultural Society" in McArdle ed., The
Cambridge Lectures 1991, supra note 54 at 148 [hereinafter "Who Owns Our Kids?"]: "We like
to think that freedom of religion has always been one of the fundamental tenets of Canadian
society. We are wrong to think so. Canadian history abounds with examples of attempts by
establishment religions, often with government support, to suppress non-establishment religious
thinking."

96. See e.g. Black, ibid. at 131-32; G.N.A. Botting, FundamentalFreedoms and Jehovah's Witnesses

(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1993); D.E. Sanders, "The Hutterites: A Case Study in
Minority Rights" (1964) 42 Can. Bar. Rev. 225. This recitation does not but certainly could
include direct and incidental incursions on the religious and spiritual practices of native
Canadians occasioned by colonization and expansion by Europeans across Canada.
97. See Robertson and Rosetanni v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 651, per Ritchie J. (upholding the Lord's Day
Act against a claim that it violated the Canadian Bill of Rights).
98. Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 at 611 (Ont. C.A.), per
LacourciWre J.A. dissenting. See also J.S. Moir, ed., Church and State In Canada, 1627-1867:

Basic Documents (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967) at xiii: "Here no established church
exists, yet neither is there an unscalable wall between religion and politics."
99. ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 93.
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of Confederation; m but this "Confederation compromise""' has become, I would
suggest, a de facto establishment of religious privilege"02 that accords to a few
groups, as a result of a historical compromise, the benefits that all or none deserve
that "no
to enjoy.'03 As one would expect with establishment, the result has been
14
other provision of the Act of 1867 has engendered so much bitterness. 0

The pre-Charterroots of freedom of religion must, in sum, be seen as having
achieved a singular confusion of ideal and reality. The tradition of guaranteeing

religious freedom in Canada had its beginnings as long ago as the United States'
tradition. However, the combination of a lack of rigorous adherence to the guarantees, as in Robertson and Rosetanni, and the de facto establishment of s. 93 of the
Constitution has created little historical or doctrinal certainty from which the courts
can draw in exploring the scope of s. 2(a) of the Charter. 5 Such a void makes the
courts more susceptible to misstep, inconsistency and error. As suggested in Parts
IV and V, as statism and liberalism have advanced ideas that are anathema to the
full flourishing of religious freedom, the courts have indeed fallen prey to errors
that might have been cured with a stronger sense of the roots of and reasons for
the guarantee of religious freedom.
IV.

The Liberal Understanding of Religion

In this section, I wish to suggest that the virtues of liberal democracy are countered
by a significant flaw: a tendency to treat rationalism and liberalism as a bedrock
epistemology, a mode of thinking that tolerates other modes of experience but
ultimately asserts its superiority over them."
100. Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 3 at 42, per Wilson J.
101. Ibid. at 61.
102. See also Sedler, supra note 63 at 583-84: "[Tlhere has been a long history of governmental
involvement with religion in Canada, and a non-establishment component [in the text of s. 2(a)l
would have been inconsistent with this aspect of the Canadian tradition."
103. See Adler, supra note 3 at 10, per Dubin CJ.O. (rejecting claim of other religious groups to
public funding for separate schools for faiths not included in the s. 93 guarantee): "The right [in
s. 2(a)] involves the freedom to pursue one's religion or beliefs without government interference,
and the entitlement to live one's life free of state-imposed religions or beliefs. It does not
provide, in my view, an entitlement to state support for the exercise of one's religion." Section
93, however, does provide that right-but only for some.
104. I. Coter, "Freedom of Conscience and Religion: Section 2(a)" in G.-A. Beaudoin and
E. Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1989).
105. Those who do not learn from history are, of course, condemned to repeat it; thus, recall Klassen's
complaint that the preamble to the Charter, with its use of the name of God, creates a built-in
contradiction of s. 2(a). Klassen, "Religion and the Nation," supra note 7 at 95. One might add
that it also effects an establishment of sorts, by suggesting a supremacy of monotheism. See also
Charter, supra note 6, s. 29, guaranteeing that the Charter in no way affects the ability of the
state to aid a few faiths only, through the separate school funding provision.
106. See Fish, supra note 11; P.F. Campos, "Secular Fundamentalism" (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev.
1814, which criticizes Rawls's version of political liberalism as "secular fundamentalism....
[which] asserts that the supreme political value is to produce a political system that accepts
liberal principles of political morality as embodiments of the supreme political value." Ibid. at
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Liberal democracy drives the social and political dialogue in post-Enlightenment
Western states such as Canada and the United States.10e Still, it is important to
acknowledge once more that the precise definition of liberalism, or even of liberal
democracy, is as elusive of definition as is the term 'religion.' It consists of a raft
of values, often conflicting, and any focus on some of the values that are part of
the liberal state may ignore the important role played by others. Thus, a focus on
the liberal state's attachment to individual rights may conceal liberal democracy's
approval of community and interest groups as intermediary institutions. In a broader
sense, a focus on liberalism's failings may lead one to forget that liberalism's
overarching values accord to religious believers a full recognition of their right to
maintain an allegiance to beliefs and practices that defy certain aspects of liberalism.
Nevertheless, I will argue that certain aspects of liberalism have a negative impact on religion. Moreover, they are not peripheral aspects of liberalism, but central
tenets of liberal thought; accordingly, they will have a strong influence on decision
making even in an ideal liberal state. As for the imperfect state in which we live,
these particular values are often in the ascendancy and have a heightened impact on
religious beliefs. These touchstones of liberalism are rationality, empiricism, skepticism, individualism, and the value of autonomy. In the modern liberal democratic
state, they are accompanied by one more common and influential value: statism,
which attaches a high value to the political and administrative goals of the properly
constituted liberal democratic state. Other values may enrich liberalism," 8 but these
particular values are at its core, particularly in the modern state. They are the focus
of this examination of liberalism.
As I have suggested above, the value of liberal democracy is its willingness to
cherish religious freedom as a valuable part of the freedom of any autonomous
individual. Where it fails is in its inability to fully recognize that religion is (or,
at least, may be) more than a mere choice on the individual's part. Rather, it is a
radically different but equally valid mode of experiencing reality."° As long as the
1824. Campos notes: "The irony, of course, is that in this triumphalist incarnation liberalism can
begin to resemble the very dogmatic systems that it once rebelled against." Ibid. at 1825.
107. See e.g. C.R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1993) at 307 ("The establishment clause creates a secular, liberal democracy"); K.M. Sullivan,
"Religion and Liberal Democracy" in G.R. Stone, R.A. Epstein & C.R. Sunstein, eds., The Bill of
Rights in the Modern State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) at 198 ("The bar against
an establishment of religion entails the establishment of a civil order-the culture of liberal
democracy-for resolving public moral disputes"); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440 at 2475 (1995), per. Ginsburg J., dissenting (citing Sullivans assertion);
Roach v. Canada (Ministerof State for Multiculturalism) (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (F.C.T.D.)
at 229 ("Canada is a secular state and although many of its laws reflect religious tradition, culture
and values, they are none the less secular or positivistic in nature"); O'Sullivan v. M.N.R, supra

note 7.
108. Note, for instance, Wilson J.'s dissent in Edwards Books, supra note 2, which endorses a vision
of the Charteras protecting "group rights as well as individual rights," ibid. at 60, and which
cautions that "respect for human rights cannot be achieved in a pluralist society without a spirit of
co-operation and goodwill on the part of all citizens but especially on the part of the majority,"

ibid. at 64.

109. Frederick Mark Gedicks puts it aptly: "[Rieligion is experienced by the believer as holistic....
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religious adherent's practices are private, or public but minimally intrusive, they
are accepted; but where these conditions do not apply, where the beliefs are taken
so seriously as to interfere with the liberal understanding of the public good, the
liberal state views religion as a choice that is wrong, unreasonable, or dangerous,
110
according to liberal epistemology, and so denies the possibility of co-existence.
Thus, for example, prayer in the abstract is tolerated or even approved of; prayer
as a substitute for medical care is quietly regarded as a form of suicide. Since the
state and the courts reason from within the liberal, rationalist paradigm, religion
must ultimately "listen to reason."
The language of liberalism betrays its misunderstanding of religion and its bias
in favour of itself in a number of ways. This section examines some of the most
common principles evident in liberalism's treatment of religion.
The most general failure on liberalism's part is its fundamentally secular understanding of religious experience, its inability to penetrate the nature of religious
experience. What is incontrovertible and evident to the religious adherent may
seem vague, mysterious, or simply inconceivable when examined from a secularist
standpoint. The language of liberalism is the language of rationalism, and whatever cannot be approached rationally is bound to meet with skepticism, at best. A
student comment on the religiously based refusal by parents of medical treatment
for their children captures superbly the frustration occasioned by a secular attempt
to understand a spiritual motivation:
The fact that so many of these deaths could have been prevented is appalling, for there
is nothing more tragic than the senseless death of a child.
Perhaps it is so easy to condemn parents who refuse medical treatment for their children because it is too difficult for most people to imagine being confronted with deeply
held religious beliefs, with the life of a child hanging in the balance."' [emphasis
added]
Notable in this plaint is the equation of irrationality and senselessness. Of course,
those whose religious beliefs force them to confront the very choice described here
would not consider senseless the goal of saving a child's soul, which is implicit
in the refusal of treatment. But the rationalist, liberal epistemology is unable to
12
support or confront judgments stemming from religious, non-rational experience."
[and] compelling ... on both the conscious and unconscious level. Both of these attributes of
religious experience are in serious tension with the assumptions of privatized religion and
secularized politics." F.M. Gedicks, "Some Political Implications of Religious Belier' (1990) 4
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 419 at 427.
110. See Culture of Disbelief supra note 13 at 15: "[The rhetoric of the liberal state sends) the subtle
but unmistakable message: pray if you like, worship if you must, but whatever you do, do not on
any account take your religion seriously."
111. L.M. Plastine, Comment, "'In God We Trust': When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment for Their
Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs" (1993) 3 Const. L.J. 123 at 124.
112. See Bradley, "Dogmatomachy," supranote 83 at 277: "The Court conceives religion ... not as
objective truth but as subjective preference."
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As Stephen Carter observes, this view that rationalism offers a factually accurate
vision of the world has a profound effect on what courts decide and how citizens are
treated; it leads to the court's according a lesser weight to religious considerations
when it makes decisions balancing state and religious goals. This phenomenon will
become clearer below, in this article's examination of the Charterjurisprudence
dealing with freedom of religion. 3
In addition to liberalism's inability to understand the nature of religious beliefs,
it also frequently errs in applying a secular, liberal understanding of the world
to religious cultures, and in the process thoroughly misunderstanding them. This
misunderstanding is most evident in secular evaluations of the structure of faith
communities, such as church hierarchies. For example, in the recent debate in
Quebec over whether Muslim schoolgirls should be allowed to wear the hijab - a
headdress that is often considered a required part of Muslim women's dress-one
line of argument advanced was that the garb connotes "the sexual exploitation of
women," t 4 and "defies the values of the equality of men and women.""' Elsewhere, Mary Becker has asserted that "[k]eeping women out of religious leadership
positions precludes a necessary prerequisite for religious freedom to mean as much
to women as to men.""' Another author has argued that "the exclusion of women
from positions of power and influence in the Catholic Church forcefully communicates the inferior status of women within the hierarchy of that church."' t 7
Applied to secular aspects of life, these are eminently sensible and sympathetic
positions. But applied to religious phenomena, these judgments are categorymistakes-that is, judgments based on liberal criteria but not on criteria that may
matter to the religious adherent herself. Religious hierarchies and practices may
in fact reflect entirely worldly illiberal ideas masquerading as spiritual beliefs. Indeed, it is for that very reason that religious dissent occurs (for example, the rift
that occurred among American Baptist churches in the 19th century over slavery).
Nevertheless, a liberal understanding of religion may miss the fact that a religious
community comprehends hierarchy and equality in a fundamentally different way.
113. See Culture of Disbelief,supra note 13 at 217, dealing with the claims of creationists: "There is,
however, a more fundamental liberal difficulty with the creationist claims: in the world of
post-Enlightenment liberalism, science deals with knowledge about the natural world, whereas
religion is simply a system of belief,based on faith"; and at 220-21, dealing with Jehovah's
Witnesses and the refusal of treatment for their children: "There is, however, a logical sense in
which the refusal to take account of the [religious] claim is to treat it as false. For if the claim is
true, life eternal would seem plainly to trump the transient life available on earth."
114. See A. Nasrulla, "Educators outside Quebec mystified by hijab ban" The Globe and Mail (13
December 1994) Al at A4 (remarks of Francois Lemieux, president of the St. Jean Baptiste
Society).
115. See R. Mackie, "Muslim headgear polarizes Quebec" The Globe and Mail (12 December 1994)
A7 (remarks of Francois Lemieux).
116. M.E. Becker, "The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of 'Rights': A Bicentennial
Perspective" in Stone, Epstein & Sunstein, The Bill of Rights in the Modem State, supra note 107

at 485.
117. J.C. Brant, "'Our Shield Belongs to the Lord': Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to
Discriminate" (1994) 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 275 at 278.
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As indicated above, another common error in liberalism's understanding of religion stems from the fact that its tolerance of religion is based on the value of the

autonomous individual: liberalism treats an individual's religion as a choice, rather
than as a compulsion or a facet of participation in a faith community. Although
the language of choice is appropriate as long as it is applied to suggest that the

religious believer should be personally free to reject a particular faith, it is often
misapplied to the loyal religious believer as well. This categorization leads to the
tendency to view a religious belief or practice as being no more essential to the
committed believer than any other autonomous individual choice."' While this ap-

proach values religion as part of the autonomy that liberalism treasures, it devalues
it by treating it as one of a set of possible choices, rather than as the ineluctable set
of duties compelling, and not merely chosen by, the religious adherent." 9

The autonomy-based toleration of religious freedom also errs in tending to treat
religion as a private activity, 2 ° and thus one that is entitled to protection as long
as it is confined to the private sphere of subjective beliefs; once it extends into
the public sphere, it is subject to countervailing 'objective' claims.' This attitude
has led to a suggestion by liberal theorists such as Kent Greenawalt that while

participants in a liberal democracy should be freely permitted to base their political
decisions on religious faith, all participation and discussion in the public sphere must
take place in commonly understood, rationally arrived at terms-in other words, in
Indeed, although he acknowledges
the language of secularism and liberalism.'
that "[t]alk about religion is important for people to understand and evaluate our
culture and the meaning of their own lives,"'" Greenawalt argues that if "publicly
118. See E. West, "The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions" (1990) 4 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 591 at 613: "[It might be said that exemptions are needed to protect
human autonomy or freedom. But all persons and groups may claim that they have as much a
right to freedom as do religious persons or groups.' See also W.P. Marshall, "The Case Against
the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption" (1989) 40 Case W. L. Rev. 357 at
408-09: "[Ljiberal theory reacts to the belief of the religious adherent as if that individual chose
her particular belief system rather than having had the truths and obligations of that belief system
imposed upon her by transcendent authority."
119. See Book Note, "Liberalism and the Limits of Religious Freedom" (1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1937 at 1939.
120. See e.g. M. Valpy, "Religion and the schools" The Globe and Mail (25 October 1995) A17:
"Religion in a liberal society belongs in private culture, in the family and the house of faith, It
does not belong in the public-school system, which is our most important instrument, our
essential instrument, of socialization, citizenship and community for all."
121. See F.M. Gedicks, "Public Life and Hostility to Religion" (1992) 78 Va. L. Rev. 671 at 676,
678-79: "[T]he purpose of the liberal state is to preserve the objectivity of public life from the
subjectivity of private life, while nonetheless ensuring that there remains sufficient private space
for the pursuit of subjective values .... Secularism constitutes the test of residency in American
public life, and religion by its nature cannot pass the test." See also F.M. Gedicks, The Rhetoric
of Church and State: A CriticalAnalysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence(Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995).
122. See K. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988); B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
123. K. Greenawalt, "Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts" (1990) 39
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accessible reasons" decisively answer a particular question, the religious adherent
in a liberal124democracy must not rely on religious reasons to oppose the rational
reasoning.
The danger of such a position is clear. If religious convictions sincerely compel
a believer's political position, to ask him or her to discount any religious aspects
inherent in that position, as Michael Perry has noted, would "preclude her-the
particularperson she is-from engaging in moral discourse with other members
of society."'" The approach also errs because it misunderstands the purpose of
religious freedom and adopts a view even stricter than Jefferson's by shutting off
the religious, not only from public office, but from public discussion. Of course,
this view will be of particular value to political groups who fear the influence of
religionists on the other side of a debate.'26
Moreover, this approach suggests that any dialogue that goes beyond rationalist
boundaries lacks social value; it effectively argues that while liberalism attempts
to find answers to questions, religion dogmatically assumes the correctness of its
answers and so frustrates the possibility of productive dialogue. Given goodwill,
however, it is possible to have conversations that embrace both secular and religious concepts,'l 7 and such conversation should be encouraged for the sake of
full social participation in the public dialogue. Notwithstanding this point, the preview continues to seek to limit religion's involvement in political
vailing liberal
dialogue."2
Ultimately, it may be argued that the liberal difficulty with religion and religious
concepts relates at least in part to a defensiveness about the future of the liberal
project itself and the future of the state. In particular, the liberal urge to circumscribe
the extent of religious entry into the political sphere, even in the sense of simple
dialogue, betrays a view that beliefs and concepts that cannot be understood in a
DePaul L. Rev. 1019 at 1035.
124. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, supra note 122 at 207.
125. See M. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A BicentennialEssay (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988) at 72-73. For a critique of Greenawalt's position, see also M. Perry, Love and
Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991) at 16-22.
126. "When conservative ministers support Ronald Reagan and speak out on their social agenda; when
Catholic bishops speak out on abortion, nuclear weapons, economic redistribution, and peace in
Central America; or when rabbis speak out on behalf of Israel, someone on the other side of the
political issue is sure to charge that these attempts to influence public policy violate separation of
church and state." D. Laycock, "Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers" (1986) 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 at 27.
127. See e.g. A.E. Cook, "God-Talk in a Secular World" (1994) 6 Yale J.L. & Human. 435 at 444-47.
128. For a Canadian example, see A. Scott, "A New Deal for Religious Broadcasting in Canada?
Continuing Political and Legal Pressures for Change" (1994) 4 M.C.L.R. 189. Scott notes a
dictate in the CRTC's Religious Broadcasting Policy requiring that programming be "entirely
religious.... The regulator must, therefore, separate out religious programming from political
offerings, and distinguish between sacred and commercial motives." Ibid. at 212. He adds: "The
theoretical, legal, historical and practical problems with state bodies making determinations about
what constitutes 'religion' are numerous." Ibid. One might add that requiring a determination of
what constitutes permissible topics of discussion for religious adherents is equally problematic.
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rational manner represent potential threats both to reason and to its offspring, liberal
democracy. Mark Tushnet has written:
Religion poses a threat to the intellectual world of the liberal tradition because it is
in the course of
a form of social life that mobilizes the deepest passions of believers
1 29
creating institutions that stand between the individual and the state.
It is more than religion's passion that threatens the liberal state, however; it is
the fact that the religious group submits to an entirely different authority, one that
cannot be reasoned with. Arguing against the accommodation of religion, Steven
Gey perceives the threat clearly, albeit in a somewhat exaggerated fashion:
[R]eligion is an alternative system of nonrational and unprovable beliefs. As such,
religion is fundamentally incompatible with the critical rationality on which democracy
depends.... The essence of the accommodation principle requires that democratic
control over certain aspects of public policy be subordinated to a higher force that is
30
beyond human control.1
It will be suggested in Part VI that such a view, while grounded in an accurate
view of religion's inability to accept temporal authority, remains fundamentally
blind to the value of religion as a social force. In any case, it is clear that, at
best, prevailing tendencies in liberal thought value religion as a strongly held but
arbitrarily chosen belief. At worst, liberals are baffled and threatened by the presence, in the midst of the modem liberal democratic state, of forces that deny the
primacy of political authority and question the finality and sufficiency of reason as
an epistemology. Reason is, nonetheless, the mode of analysis that we expect from
the courts in the proper performance of their duties-and, as will become clear
below, the effects on religion of a conscientiously applied rational approach can be
devastating.
V.

Right and Wrong Turns: Judicial Applications of Liberalism and Rationalism to Religion

It has been suggested that certain aspects of liberalism may lead to an improper relegation of religion to the private sphere and an inevitable finding that religious claims
must be subordinated to rationally conceived goals. At the same time, however, it
must be acknowledged that liberalism is also a culture of rights. Notwithstanding the
secularist aspects of liberalism, the Charter's guarantee of freedom of conscience
and religion establishes that, subject to limits, religion is a fundamental freedom;

129. M. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalLaw (Cambridge, Mass,:

Harvard University Press, 1988) at 248. Tushnet argues that a society that adopts the republican
tradition will appreciate the communitarian value of religion more than a liberal society.
130. Gey, supra note 70 at 176, 186.
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similarly, the First Amendment establishes a claim of religious freedom to 'firstness' among rights. 131 Where liberalism's secularist tendencies may be influential,
then, is in shaping the scope and limits of the right. In particular, once the religious
believer's claim extends beyond freedom of religious belief to freedom of religious
action, his or her right may face limits, which in turn 32will face a justification test
phrased in the language of liberalism and rationalism.'
In exploring the scope and limits of religious freedom as outlined in Canadian and
American jurisprudence, I wish to suggest that the same inability to give proper
credence to the claims of religion which was apparent in this article's general
examination of liberalism's pitfalls may also be found in numerous decisions by
the courts of both nations. Though courts in both countries have at times given a
rich scope to the guarantee of freedom of religion, effectively carving out religion as
a "forbidden zone" for the legislature, 33 judicial trends in the United States, and the
structure of the Charterin Canada, have created an unfortunate tendency toward an
"inappropriate statism.., an inordinate faith in government."'"l Consequently, the
courts have been quicker to accept the claims of the state over the equally pressing
claims of the religious believer. This can be seen in an examination of certain
leading Canadian and American cases, and of the courts' treatment of freedom
of religion in 'hard cases'-cases presenting equally compelling claims by both
religious believers and the state.
A. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
The leading trilogy of cases in defining freedom of religion in Canada, Big M,
Edwards Books, and R. v. Jones,35 attempted early on in the development of Charter
jurisprudence to build an expansive definition of the right. They hoped to provide
a "generous" interpretation of the right without "overshoot[ing] the actual purpose

131. See Weinrib, "Reading the Lesson," supra note 62 at 508-09: "Although the primacy of speech
protection within the American scheme of protecting constitutionalized rights is often heralded as
symbolically embodied in the 'firstness' of the first amendment, it is not speech but religion that
the framers put first." Whether speech, religion, or other fundamental freedoms have a claim to a
particular primacy among rights in Canada is not essential to any arguments made in this article;
it simply assumes that these fundamental freedoms are all of strong importance to the Canadian

democratic project.
132. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 at 164 (1878) ("Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order"); McLachlin, "Who Owns Our Kids?," supra note 95
at 150 ("While there may be an absolute constitutional right to believe what one wishes, the right
of action pursuant to those beliefs may be limited by other considerations").
133. See S.J. Godfrey, "Freedom of Religion and the Canadian Bill of Rights" (1964) 22 U.T. Fac.
L. Rev. 60 at 68 ("When a Constitution or a Bill of Rights sets up a guarantee for 'freedom of
religion', it in effect establishes a 'forbidden zone' into which other legislation may not go").
134. M. McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads" in Stone, Epstein & Sunstein, The Bill of
Rights in the Modem State, supra note 107 at 116 [hereinafter "Religious Freedom at a

Crossroads"].
135. (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Jones].
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of the right"; 136 and it must be acknowledged that the Supreme Court did in fact
fashion a broad interpretation of the freedom of religion.
In interpreting the right in Big M, which struck down the federal Lord's Day Act
as unconstitutional, Dickson J. (as he then was) rejected a strict distinction between
belief and action. Writing for the majority in Edwards Books, which found that
Ontario's Retail Business Holidays Act constituted a reasonable limit on freedom
of religion, Dickson C.J.C. similarly rejected a strict distinction between direct and
indirect burdens placed on the exercise of religion:
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious
beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without
right to manifest belief by worship and practice
fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the
37
or by teaching and dissemination.
In my opinion, indirect coercion by the State is comprehended within the evils from
which s. 2(a) may afford protection .... It matters not, I believe, whether a coercive
burden is direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable.138
Even more valuable in the long run, perhaps, is Dickson J.'s rejection in Big M of
a formal neutrality rule, which would require 'equal' treatment of religions even
though different religions might benefit from different relationships with the state:
The equality necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical treatment
of all religions. In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation
139
in treatment.
At the same time, the Court in these cases began to draw up limits to the right,
and it is here that elements of secular or liberal bias, or of a simple misunderstanding
of minority religious practices, begin to become apparent. First, in rooting freedom
of religion so firmly in the notion of "the centrality of individual conscience," the
Court adopted the view of religion as belief or choice, and as an individual rather
than a community experience. While this may rarely have an impact on actual
judicial decision making, it indicates a Court more comfortable with addressing
religion in the context of individual rights, rather than the context of duty and
group worship which the religious believer experiences.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Big M, supra note 2 at 361.
Ibid. at 353.
Edwards Books, supra note 2 at 34.
Big M, supra note 2 at 362. For support of a 'true equality' approach to religious freedom, see
M. McConnell, "Accommodation of Religion" [1985] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Laycock, "The Remnants
of Free Exercise," supra note 9. But see W.P. Marshall, "The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption," supra note 118; R. Teitel, "When Separate is Equal: Why
Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools" (1986) 81
Nw. U. L. Rev. 175; E. West, "The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions," supra
note 118.
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The limit itself, as suggested in Big M, appears quite reasonable:
The values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions demand that every
individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her
conscience dictates, provided, inter alia, only that such manifestations do not injure
or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions
his or her neighbours
140
of their own.
It should be noted that elsewhere in the decision, Dickson J. also subjects religion
to the limit of the "public ...morals,"' 141 a limit that has been used in the United
States to effect such improper intrusions on religious life as the criminalization
of polygamous marriage by Mormons. 42 Use of a public morality justification
to disturb a religious community's notions of morality simply affords too great an
opportunity for state intervention, particularly where, as in the example of polygamy,
the 'morality' in question is not closely related to the public's health or safety and the
alleged immorality is a matter of custom that affects only the faithful. Nevertheless,
with that phrase excepted, the limit appears to be as narrow as the right is broad.
In the same trilogy of decisions, however, the Court indicates that religious freedom may be more circumscribed thart Dickson J.'s statement implies. In particular,
the Court has suggested that not all infringements on freedom of religion will reach
the threshold of a s. 2(a) violation. In Edwards Books, Dickson C.J.C. wrote:
This does not mean, however, that every burden on religious practices is offensive to
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion .... The purpose of s. 2(a) is to
ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personalbeliefs that govern one's
perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order
of being.... The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that
143
[emphasis
religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened.
added]
Wilson J. further fleshed out this limit in Jones, writing:
Legislative or administrative action whose effect on religion is trivial or insubstantial
is not, in my view, a breach of freedom of religion.'"
This approach suggests a number of dangers. First, of course, it once again adopts
the language of religion as personal, privately held belief, thus impliedly leaving
to the public sphere the dominance of liberalism and rationalism. Moreover, it
140. Big M, ibid. at 361.
141. Ibid. at 354.
142. Reynolds v. United States, supra note 132.
143. EdwardsBooks, supra note 2 at 34-35.
144. Jones, supra note 135 at 578.
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suggests that the courts will launch an inquiry into what constitutes a serious threat
to religious belief or practice and what is a mere trivial or insubstantial breach.
What may seem like trivial interference from a rationalist perspective, however,
may be vital to one whose religion suggests that a certain practice is important or
necessary to his or her faith.
Consider what was actually at issue in Jones: the appellant claimed that Alberta's requirement that he apply for certification for his private religious school
would constitute a forced acknowledgement of the authority of the state, rather than
the supremacy of God. 4 To Wilson J., the province's requirement seemed both
reasonable and minor:
No one is asking the appellant to replace God with the school board as the source of
his right and his duty to educate his children. They are merely asking him to have
the quality of his instruction approved by the secular authorities .... If the statutory
machinery has any impact at all on the appellant's freedom
of conscience and religion
146
... it is an extremely formalistic and technical one.
As La Forest J. pointed out, however, it would "negate history" to ignore the
fact that for centuries, the church played a more significant role than the state in
providing education;1 47 it might also be added that only a poor understanding of
religion would fail to recognize that, for many, to acknowledge an authority other
than that of God is to betray one's faith. Clearly, Wilson J. is driven by a rationalist
view that the interference simply did not rise to a serious level. This approach errs
by failing to adopt the adherent's view of what constitutes a serious breach of
religious faith; to Jones, the Court's decision may have been the equivalent of the
state's asking him to risk his own damnation. Placing the limit as Wilson J. does at
4
the level of the right rather than at the justification stage of s. 1 M-and
recall that
in Videoflicks the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested a similar test, demanding that
the practice in question be an essential tenet of the adherent's faith' 4 9-suggests
that even the definition of 'freedom of religion' will be driven by non-religious
reasoning.
An additional factor contributing to a statist, rationalist approach to freedom
of religion is the structure of the Charter, which separates the right of religious
freedom in s. 2(a) from the limit on a freedom as stated in s. 1:
145. Ibid. at 575.

146. Ibid. at 578-79. Wilson J.'s point is somewhat misleading, however, as Jones did not object to the
subsequent testing of his pupils, only to the ex ante requirement that the state sanction his school.
147. Ibid. at 591, per La Forest J. concurring.
148. For United States cases acknowledging that licensing requirements may offend religious beliefs
and emphasizing the state's compelling interest rather than the triviality of the violation, see e.g.
People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. S.C. 1993); State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316

(N.D.S.C. 1988), cert. den. 109 S.Ct. 491 (1989). While the result may be the same, this
approach at least need not treat a religious belief as trivial in order to dispense with the religious
adherent's claim.
149. Videoflicks, supra note 21.
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The CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights set out in it subject

only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society. 50
Lorraine Weinrib has suggested that s. 1 ought to be read to require the limit
imposed to be based not on pure utilitarian grounds, which would favour the state,
but according to whether imposing the limit will forward the values of a free and
democratic society.' 5' Unfortunately, the courts have neither escaped utilitarianism
nor given full credit to the democratic interpretation of s. 1. Rather, I would argue
that they have given s. 1 an interpretation that often stresses the primacy of the
needs and goals of the state, and that reflects the rationalist and liberal tradition
from whence the Charterwas born.
The language of s. 1, as expressed in the definitive case of R. v. Oakes,152 is the
evaluative language of rational liberalism. It focuses substantially on the reasonableness of the state's goals; thus, among other factors, the state's concerns must
be "pressing and substantial," and the impairment must bear a "rational connection"
to the goal. The courts are required to ensure that the limit is proportionate to the
goal. Nevertheless, I would suggest that, steeped as they are in the tradition of
liberalism and rationalism, and facing state arguments that are crafted in rationalist
terminology and serve liberal ideals, the courts are likely to take the state's claims
more seriously than the claims of the believer 15that
his or her ineffable, rationally
3
incomprehensible needs must take precedence.
Indeed, developments in s. 1 jurisprudence in recent years have suggested that
the courts will apply the language of Oakes in a manner that is highly deferential
to the state's claims of reasonableness. 54 In particular, the courts are unlikely
to disagree with the state's claim that it is advancing a pressing and substantial
objective. 5 5 In R. v. Lee,156 for instance, the Supreme Court was willing to accept
the efficient administration of justice as a pressing and substantial objective; for
150.
151.
152.
153.

Charter,supra note 6.
Weinrib, "The Supreme Court and Section One of the Charter," supra note 17.
(1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 (S.C.C.).
But see Wilson .'s dissent on the interpretation of s. 1 in EdwardsBooks, supra note 2, for an
interpretive vision that accords significant weight to minority interests when balancing them with
state claims. For a defence of Oakes against claims that it is too stringent, arguing instead that it
rejects utilitarianism to find that "the same values undergird limits on rights as inform the rights
themselves," see Weinrib, "The Supreme Court and Section One of the Charter," supra note 17 at
483. Unfortunately, if these values are themselves informed by pure liberalism rather than by a
pluralist acceptance of the claims of non-rational experience, the effect on the religious adherent
may be substantially identical.
154. For scholarship advancing this thesis, see e.g. C.M. Dassios and C.P. Prophet, "Charter Section 1:
The Decline of Grand Unified Theory and the Trend Towards Deference in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1993) 15 Advocates' Q. 289; A. Lokan, "The Rise and Fall of Doctrine Under Section
1 of the Charter" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 163; P.W. Hogg, "Section I Revisited" (1991) 1
N.J.C.L. 1.
155. See Dassios and Prophet, ibid. at 292, suggesting that judicial treatment of this section of the
Oakes test "illustrates the trend from activism to deference."
156. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384.
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religious observers, whose practices interfere with efficient state administration,
157
such deference is plainly of concern.
Moreover, the courts have also shown a frequent unwillingness to strictly enforce the minimal impairment test, preferring instead to be deferential to the state's
legislative scheme. This resiling from Oakes's strict standard is evident in the statement in Edwards Books that a "reasonable alternative scheme" [emphasis added]
must be available before the legislation fails this branch of the test. 158 This ruling
suggests a subtle shift in emphasis: rather than concentrate on the broad ambit of
the infringement, the courts will inquire as to the reasonableness of the impairment
given the state's objective. Since the courts take a broad view of what constitutes
a pressing and substantial objective, any number of restrictions might then, if argued by a competent lawyer, be said to be reasonable.159 This will jeopardize any
religious observers whose practices fall under the scope of a restrictive piece of
legislation, which might have been tailored more compassionately at the reasonable
cost of some effectiveness.
The courts' deference to reason-driven state claims is borne out by their approach
to the balancing of religious freedom against the claims of the state. Thus, in Edwards Books, Dickson C.J.C. ruled that an exemption that was not broad enough to
include all Sabbatarian observers, and would thus have the effect of sundering the
community of worshippers in a Saturday-observing faith,16° constituted a reasonable
limit on freedom of religion. What was balanced against the religious community's
claims? In response, Dickson J. invoked the need for a common pause day, rhapsodizing over such secular values as "a picnic, a swim, or a hike in the park on a
summer day, or a family expedition to a zoo.' 6' In addition, he noted the difficulty
of launching judicial inquiries into the believer's claim.
In R. v. Gruenke, 62 the Court found that there were insufficient policy interests
to grant a primafacie privilege to religious communications between, for instance,
priest and penitent. The decision thus suggested, in some cases at least, a subordination of the "human need for a spiritual counsellor m63 to the goals of the
state.
In Hothi v. R. and Mitchell Prov. J.,"6 the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench
upheld the order of a Provincial Court judge forbidding the presence of kirpans (Sikh
157. But see R. v. Zundel (1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 202 (S.C.C.) (law against spreading false news does

not clearly show substantial objective).
158. EdwardsBooks, supra note 2 at 44.

159. See also the suggestion in Irwin Toy v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 994, that the

government only has to show a "reasonable basis ... for concluding" that the regulation impairs

a right as little as possible "given the government's pressing and substantial objective."
160. See the partially dissenting opinion of Wilson J.: "[To grant only a partial exemption] is to

introduce an invidious distinction into the group and sever the religious and cultural tie that binds
them together." EdwardsBooks, supra note 2 at 61.

161. Ibid. at 42-43.
162. (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
163. Ibid. at 320, per L'Heureux-Dubb J. concurring.
164. [1985] 3 W.W.R. 256 (Man. Q.B.), aff'd [1986] 3 W.W.R. 671 (Man. C.A.).
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ceremonial knives) in the courtroom. The court found that a reasonable limit existed;
this decision was based partly on safety concerns, but largely on a "transcending
public interest that justice be administered in an environment free from any influence
which may tend to thwart the process."" 6 Thus, statist concerns led the court to
view the kirpan not as a religious implement worn by a full participant in the justice
system, but as a threatening influence interfering with the justice system.166
In sum, the courts' view of reasonable limits may be seen as having been
grounded in traditional liberal concepts and a rule of rationalism. Rational standards cannot help but support rational goals over religious needs. And while such
standards may serve the social interests of the moment, they risk sacrificing the
deeper public interest in the full participation of religious adherents in society.
B. LEADING AMERICAN CASES
Though the American freedom of religion jurisprudence is in large measure as
skeptical toward religious claims as is the Canadian jurisprudence, a line of cases,
beginning in 1963 with Sherbert v. Verner,16 has created for some religious believers some exemptions from generally applicable laws. 68 This line of cases has
shown a sympathetic understanding of the compelling nature of religious obligation
and of some sects' need to maintain certain practices, or even their whole existence,
outside the realm of state control. Thus, in Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist who
was fired for her refusal to work on Saturday (Adventists are Sabbatarian observers)
was denied unemployment benefits since that statute barred benefits to workers who
failed to accept suitable work when offered. The Supreme Court upheld her claim
that the state's denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. Brennan J.,
writing for the Court, held that the state must show a "compelling state interest"
in interfering with a religious practice. 69 Stewart J., concurring, acknowledged the
accommodationist undercurrent of the result:
165. Ibid. at 259.
166. Kirpans have been allowed in other contexts, subject to certain rules (such as the blunting of the
blade), even where safety concerns might be greater, given the absence of guards and bailiffs.
Compare with Hothi the richly pluralistic approach of Wachowich J. in Tuli v. St. Albert
ProtestantSeparate School (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D13906 (Alta. Q.B). The decision granted an
interim injunction against the school board to allow a student to wear his kirpan. Wachowich J.
suggested at para. 3907 that the presence of the kirpan "would provide those who are unfamiliar
with the tenet of his faith an opportunity to be introduced to and to develop an understanding of
another's culture and heritage.... I might also comment, perhaps this Court secretly wishes it
had been fortunate enough during my own formative years to have been exposed during that
period of youth to the benefits of another's culture and religion so as to have developed a better
appreciation of the richness of one's heritage.' See also Peel Board of Education v. Ontario
Human Rights Commission (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 475 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (upholding
Commission's finding that a ban on the wearing of kirpans in the schools was impermissible
discrimination).
167. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
168. See R.D. Rotunda and J.E. Nowak, Treatise on ConstitutionalLaw: Substance and Procedure,

2nd. ed., vol. 4 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1992) at 520.
169. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 167 at 406.

University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review

36

Volume 54, Number I

I think that the guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exercise Clause
an atmosphere of hospitality and accomaffirmatively requires government to create
170
modation to individual belief or disbelief.
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 7' perhaps the high point of support of accommodation by the Court, the Amish were granted an exemption from state laws
requiring attendance in high school. Despite the state's significant interest in educating children, 172 Burger C.J. found that it did not warrant interfering with the
desire of the Amish community to live apart from society and according to their religious customs. The state could not prevail unless it showed a compelling interest,
one "of the highest order."' 173 Thus, the Court obviated any potential judicial bias in
favour of the state's rational goals by according religious groups a right of accommodation unless an extremely important state interest was at stake; moreover, the
state would be required to show that an exemption would actually hurt the operation
of the legislation in question. 74 What is significant here is not just the exacting
standard placed in the way of the state; equally important is the courts' sympathetic
view of the need to meet spiritual obligations, even in the face of substantial state
interests.
Unfortunately, as Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have observed, "In
the Court's more modem experience, the Sherbert line and Yoder emerge as exceptions rather than the rule."'75 In a series of cases in the second half of the 1980s,
the Supreme Court began to swing from a sympathetic understanding of religion to
a view that treated religion as a spanner in the works of the orderly workings of the
liberal state. In Goldman v. Weinberger,'76 the Court upheld a military restriction
against the wearing of a yarmulke while in dress uniform, accepting the military's
argument that it had an interest in "the subordination of personal preferences and
identities in favor of the overall group mission";1 77 as the dissent noted, this interest had not prevented the military from allowing some individual dress, such as
jewelry.178 In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,79 the Court found unconstitutional a
170.
171.
172.
173.

Ibid. at 415-16.
Supra note 31.
See e.g., Jones, supra note 135 at 592.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra note 31 at 215.

174. See e.g. Frankv. State, 604 P.2d 1068 at 1073 (Alaska S.C. 1979) (reversing conviction for
unlawful killing of a moose where the moose was killed for meat for a religious funeral
ceremony): "It is not enough, however, simply to conclude that there is a compelling interest....
The question is whether that interest, or any other, will suffer if an exemption is granted to
accommodate the religious practice at issue." See also Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th
Cir. 1984), aff'd 105 S.Ct. 3492 (1985).
175. C.L. Eisgruber and L.G. Sager, "The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct" (1994), 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245 at 1247.
176. 106 S.Ct. 1310 (1986).
177. Ibid. at 508.
178. Ibid. at 1319, per Brennan J.dissenting. He added: "A critical function of the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against quiet
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statute requiring employers to accommodate their employees' sabbath preferences.
In her concurrence, O'Connor J. suggested, "All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, would value... the right to select the day of the week in which
to refrain from labor."18
In O'Lone v. EstateofShabazz,'' the Court upheld a prison's restrictions on some
aspects of a Muslim prisoner's religious practices, 8 2 applying a mere reasonableness
83
standard of justification to ensure "appropriate deference to prison officials."' In
84
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssn.,' the Court declined to apply
a compelling interest test in a case involving plans by the government to build roads
and commence logging operations on government land that had long been used for
religious purposes by several native American tribes who believed the ground was
sacred.
The culmination of these cases was the landmark decision of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 5' In that 1990 decision, Scalia
J. wrote a majority opinion stating that legislation need not meet the stricter compelling interest test if it is "neutral [and] generally applicable."' 86 Accordingly,
the Court upheld a denial of employment benefits to native Americans who were
discharged from their jobs as state employees for ingesting peyote as part of the
religious ceremonies of their faith."
The Court's judgment is a singular example of the infusion of statist bias into
judicial decision making and an example of how rationalist modes of judgment
interfere with an understanding of the importance and compelling nature of religious
claims. It is an example of the danger of rationalist assessments of the relative
importance of religious obedience compared with obedience to temporal authority.
Scalia J.warns that a society that applies a compelling interest test to all laws
"would be courting anarchy," and that the danger "increases in direct proportion

179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as
unimportant, because unfamiliar." Ibid. at 1321.
472 U.S. 703 (1984).
Ibid. at 711. Michael McConnell notes: "It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find
that he has 'selected the day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people
have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God."
McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads," supra note 134 at 125.
107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987).
In fact, a mandatory practice, according to his beliefs; see ibid. at 2410, per Brennan J. dissenting.
Ibid. at 2404, per Rehnquist C.J.
108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988).
110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) [hereinafter Smith].
Ibid. at 1601; see also 1602-05.
For a case upholding a Free Exercise claim against a criminal prosecution for the religious use of
peyote, see People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Calif. S.C. 1964). In R. v. Kerr (1986), 75 N.S.R.
(2d) 305 (N.S.C.A.), where the accused had argued that his use and cultivation of marijuana was
religiously motivated, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the
accused had failed to demonstrate the existence of a religious belief. The Court further stated that
even if the accused's s. 2(a) rights had been violated, the application of the Narcotic ControlAct
would be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter.
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to the society's diversity of religious beliefs.' 18 He acknowledges that, since the
majority tends to design the social structure to suit its own needs,
[i]t
may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 89
This decision has been amply criticized elsewhere." It need only be noted here
that the decision represents a clear statement that religion is viewed as an arbitrary,
potentially fraudulent preference, and as a threat to the social order, which, from
the point of view of the liberal state, it is. Of course, most faiths obey most
temporal laws, few faiths would require any exemptions at all, and few exemptions
would arise in sufficient numbers to significantly interfere with important state
goals. Further, Scalia J.'s remark that the lack of protection for minority faiths is
an unavoidable consequence of democratic government ignores the possibility that
the First Amendment was designed to guard against just that contingency. In short,
Smith demonstrates that a liberal, statist approach may not take religious claims
seriously enough to allow them to overcome temporal authority.
Though this article has concentrated on Free Exercise claims in the American
jurisprudence, much Establishment Clause jurisprudence can also be said to be the
product of secularist, state-protective thinking. Perhaps the clearest example of this
is the Supreme Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 9' which has been called
"the traditional establishment clause test."'9' Lemon established a three-pronged test
to determine whether government action does or does not violate the Establishment
Clause:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
the statute must
effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religion; finally,
93
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

188. Smith, supra note 185 at 1604. For a Canadian expression of a similar sentiment, but which
focuses on trivial religious claims, see Wilson J.'s statement in Jones,supra note 135 at 579: "To

state that any legislation which has an effect on religion, no matter how minimal, violates the
religious guarantee would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. . .

."

(citation

omitted).
189. Smith, ibid. at 1606.

190. See e.g. McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads," supra note 134; M. McConnell, "Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision" 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990); Laycock, "The
Remnants of Free Exercise," supra note 9. But see West, "The Case Against a Right to
Religion-Based Exemptions," supranote 118; Marshall, "The Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption", supra note 118; W.P. Marshall, "In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism" (1991) 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (defending certain conclusions
reached in Smith but criticizing aspects of the judgment).
191. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) [hereinafter Lemon].
192. Tribe, supra note 22 at 1191.
193. Lemon, supra note 191 at 612-13.
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Though Lemon has occasioned much scholarly and judicial disagreement, and is not
always followed,' 94 it remains a potent force shaping the course of Establishment
Clause decisions. 5 Its force as good precedent was recognized by the Court as
recently as 1993,6 despite a sardonic rebuke from a dissenting Scalia J., who
wrote:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon haunts our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ....1
The Lemon test is plainly shot through with the liberal democratic view of religion as a subject to be approached with the utmost suspicion, in terms that will
inevitably exclude religion from the public sphere. First, the secular purpose prong,
on its surface, fails to distinguish between the impermissible religious purpose of
effecting a religious establishment or enforcing a religious orthodoxy and the valuable religious purpose of accommodating deeply held religious beliefs and practices
or lending equal support to religious institutions; thus, any effort to aid the religious
believer becomes suspect.' 9s The second prong, too, "fails to distinguish between
advancing religion and advancing religiousfreedom."'9 Finally, the entanglement
prong, vague and cautious, suggests a singular fear of the corrupting influence of
any contact between the two spheres, secular and religious. Any dealings with a
religion, even those designed to aid its position as an autonomous and independent
social institution, may raise the spectre of "entanglement." Thus, the courts mandate the relegation of religious institutions to a neglected and unfavoured status in
the public sphere. And, as Stephen Carter points out, all this arose out of a case in
194. See e.g. Marsh v. Chanbers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the use of state legislative
chaplains); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992) (upholding Establishment Clause claim
without using the Lemon test); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, supra note
107, and Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., supra note 79 (most recent
Establishment Clause decisions by the Court; not grounded on Lemon).
195. See e.g. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (relying on Lemon to strike down New York
program under which public school teachers offered supplementary classes in parochial schools);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, supra note 76 (relying on Lemon to strike down Massachusetts law that
allowed churches and schools to prevent liquor licences from being issued to restaurants within
500 feet of them). But see M.S. Paulsen, "Lemon is Dead" (1993) 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795
(arguing that Lemon has been silently overturned by the Supreme Court and replaced with a
coercion-based test); Bradley, "Dogmatomachy," supra note 83 (approving of Lemon but arguing
that "the 'test' no longer even purports to decide cases").
196. Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches School District, 113 S.Ct. 2141 at 2148 n. 7 (1993), per
White J.: "IT]here is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon, however
frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled."
197. Ibid. at 2149.
198. See Paulsen, supra note 195 at 801 (the prong was frequently read as if it required "functional
hostility" toward religion); McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads," supra note 134 at
129 ("To the extent that Lemon's purpose prong requires the government to turn a blind eye to
the impact of its actions on religion, on the implicit assumption that secular effects are all that
matter, it is a recipe for intolerance").
199. McConnell, ibid.
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which the benefits to religion were both reasonable and modest: in Lemon, the Court
found unconstitutional the simple benefit of providing to religious schools, along

with all other private schools, reimbursement for the cost of textbooks, materials,
and some salaries for the teaching of non-religious subjects. 2, °
Thus, both halves of the Religion Clauses have exhibited the same liberal reluctance to treat religion as a valued social institution. Instead, while religious
behaviour may be respected as a private activity, once religion interferes with the
state's rational goals or attempts to receive the same favour as other institutions in
2
society, it will be viewed as a potential threat to the social order. 1'
C. HARD CASES
While the cases above have given a general idea of the liberal, statist tendencies

driving the high courts' views of freedom of religion-and their respect, at times,
for religious freedom-it must be remembered that lower courts must give effect

to these views on a daily basis in the adjudication of the multitude of disputes
before them. These courts' views can be seen most clearly in an examination of

hard cases involving serious competing claims by both the believer and the state; in
these cases the courts are compelled to give the clearest exposition of their reasons

for judgment for one side or the other. An examination of the courts' work in two
related areas, both of which have seen recent decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada-custody disputes involving children, and the refusal of medical treatment
for religious reasons-reveals that where both sides have strong claims, the liberal
inability to treat religious belief as seriously as secularly based reasoning leads most
often to the victory of temporal authority over religious obligation.
i) Custody and Access Disputes

As Madam Justice Beverley McLachlin has noted, the task of striking a balance
between religious freedom and the protection of children is "one of the most difficult
that can ever challenge a lawyer or confront a judge.' '2e Divorcing parents often
200. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief,supra note 13 at 110.

201. Abner S. Greene has suggested a slightly different model of the Religion Clauses, which
disfavours religion with one half but grants it special dispensations with the other; see A.S.
Greene, "The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses" (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 1611. Greene
argues that-the Establishment Clause should be read as excluding the enactment of any legislation
that expressly advances religious values; in exchange for this disenfranchisement, religious
adherents are granted exemptions from generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause,
Ibid. at 1613. With respect, this is no solution; it will merely create a Potemkin village of public
discourse, in which religious identity and motivation will be hidden from view and religious
adherents will be compelled to adopt stratagems of insincerity in order to join in public dialogue
on political issues. Surely the best cure for the use of religious speech in the political arena is the
fact that in a culture that is grounded in liberal democracy, those who use extra-rational language
are likely to sway fewer people and hence less likely to form majorities. This fact, and the
factionalism prevailing in a multi-religious society, make a draconian interpretation of the
Establishment Clause unnecessary.
202. McLachin, "Who Owns Our Kids?," supra note 95 at 158.
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each wish to expose a child to his or her religion or to prevent the other parent
from doing so. It is not surprising, then, to find that judicial reasoning in such
cases lays bare many of the assumptions underlying judicial views of religion. At
their worst, decisions in this area may exhibit an outright impatience with religious
claims raised by parents. Thus, in Hockey v. Hockey,20 3 the Ontario High Court of
Justice overturned a trial judge's order that prevented a divorced father, a Jehovah's
Witness, from taking his children to church; the children's mother, the custodial
parent, was a Roman Catholic. The trial judge had stated:
I can merely suggest in the strongest terms that the father disabuse himself of the idea
Failure to act
that it is his duty or right to export his religious beliefs to his children.
24
sensibly in that regard might eventually lead to a denial of access. 0
More commonly, judges ruling in custody disputes recognize the value of religion, but are willing to place stringent limits on a non-custodial parent's religion.
This restriction is based on the easily over-extended argument that any conflict
between the parents' religious beliefs will result in confusion for the child, and
that such confusion is tantamount to a harm that violates the child's best interests.
For example, in Brown v. Brown, 5 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld an
order granting a father access to his children as long as he did not take them to
religious services; the trial judge had said, "If both parents are pushing a different
brand of religion it may well have a harmful effect on the children." 2" In B.(L.) v.
C.(J.), °7 the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside part of a custody order prohibiting
the parent from taking his child to meetings of the Jehovah's Witnesses, but upheld
the part of the order prohibiting him from taking the child door-to-door as part of
his religious duties. In Milton v. Milton, 8 a father was ordered not to make any
religious remarks in front of his children.
This harm-based approach, like the more impatient approach exhibited by the
trial judge in Hockey, leads to this danger: it requires the courts to sever one part
of a religious parent's beliefs from the rest, an act that severs the parent's very
identity. Moreover, it does so on the assumption that the children's confusion at
facing two competing faiths is more harmful than the benefit of allowing parents to
convey their religious identities to their children. It must be acknowledged that some
disputes will unquestionably result in more harm than mere 'confusion'; still, given
the potential benefit of the free communication of the elements of selfhood between
family members, the courts should at least be very cautious when considering claims
of harm.
203. (1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 765 (Ont. H.C.J.).
204. Ibid. at
205. (1983),
206. Ibid. at
207. (1991),
208. (1985),

767.
3 D.L.R. (4th) 283 (Sask. C.A.).
285.
91 D.L.R. (4th) 27 (Que. C.A.).
64 N.B.R. (2d) 165 (Q.B.).
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The courts also evince a suspicion at non-traditional faiths and forms of worship
(for example, the door-to-door proselytization in B.(L.)), which may have a disparate
impact on parents who wish to share with their children a way of life that deviates
from mainstream liberal society. 2' Thus, of particular concern to Veit J. in Borrisv.
Borris,"' in which a father was restricted from sharing his religion with his children,
was that the tenets of the father's Pentecostal faith included women's subservience
21 2
1
to men and the damnation of non-Pentecostalists. ' In Droit de lafamille-955,
Malouf J. noted his concern that
the principles by which the father lives as indicated in his preaching would direct the
child's education, in the broadest sense of the term, against current trends, advocating,
for example, paternal power rather than parental authority, austerity in leisure rather
than, perhaps, participating in a213sport, a dominant role for men rather than the principle
of equality between the sexes.
Similarly, in Brown v. Brown, one of the trial judge's concerns was the practice by
members of the father's religious community of associating only with members of
their own faith.2" 4
It was to be hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions in the
area would clear up the confusion and direct courts to show an appropriate respect
for the value of parents' religion; however, the conflicting judgments in Young v.
Young2 5 and Droit de la famille-115026 show opposing approaches to religion
even at the highest level. 217 The cases both involved disputes between parents
over whether the non-custodial parent could expose his children to aspects of his
faith. McLachlin J.'s judgment in Young, holding that the mere fact of conflicting
religious beliefs does not present a threat to the child's best interests, shows a clear
sensitivity to the importance of religion in the family's life and the benefits of
209. See J. Syrtash, Religion and Culture in CanadianFamily Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 87:
"The courts are prejudiced against those religions that encompass an entire way of life, and which
insulate themselves from the community as a whole, even though the courts purportedly claim not
to prefer one religion over another... . 'Real harm' is more likely to be found if the parent is a
Jehovah's Witness living in Quebec, than if the parent is a Catholic or Protestant, particularly if
the congregant canvasses door to door with his children against the custodial parent's wishes."
210. (1991), 37 R.F.L. (3d) 339 (Alta. Q.B.).
211. In fairness, these concerns related to Veit J.'s concem that the children not be confused about the
safety of their own souls or their mother's; but for fear of these two aspects of his faith, which
may be shared quietly by more mainstream Christian and other sects, the father was restrained
from conveying all other aspects of his faith.
212. [1991] R.J.Q. 599 (C.A.), noted in B.(L.) v. C.(J.), supra note 207.
213. Droit de lafamille-955,ibid. at 602 [translation).
214. Brown v. Brown, supra note 205 at 290-91.
215. (1993), 49 R.F.L. (3d) 117 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Young].
216. (1993), 49 R.F.L. (3d) 317 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Droitde lafamille].
217. For critical commentary on these decisions, see W.G. How, Case Comment, "Young v. Young and
D.P. v. C.S.: Custody and Access-The Supreme Court Compounds Confusion" (1994) 11
C.F.L.Q. 109; G.D. Chipeur and T.M. Bailey, "Honey, I Proselytized the Kids: Religion as a
Factor in Child Custody and Access Disputes" (1994) 4 N.C.L.J. 101.
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was-that is, as a devoutly religious
"coming to know [the children's] father as he2 18
faith.
Witness
Jehovah's
the
to
devoted
man
In Droit de la famille, however, the Court upheld a trial judge's finding that
the parents' conflicting religions would harm the child, despite the lack of strong
evidence in support of the finding, and approved the judge's order prohibiting the
father from sharing with his child his practices as a Jehovah's Witness. Particularly
distressing is L'Heureux-Dub6's J.'s reliance on the fact that "the trial judge's
order refers to the appellant's 'religious fanaticism' and not to the normal exercise
of his religion in respect of his child."" 9 Quite apart from the endorsement of a
loaded term such as "fanaticism," the decision suggests a standard for distinguishing
acceptable and unacceptable religious behaviour that is bound to favour mainstream
religious practices-practices that are commonplace and inoffensive to the liberal
standard of behaviour." 0 One hopes that lower courts will follow the path set by
McLachlin J. rather than her colleague.2

ii) Refusal of Medical Treatment
Many of the concerns observed in the preceding section apply to the refusal of
medical treatment, particularly where a parent refuses treatment on behalf of his
or her child. In such cases, both claims are heightened: the state's interest is in
the preservation of life, whereas the person refusing treatment is concerned with
the salvation of a soul.2 This article acknowledges that the state's compelling
interest in preserving a child's life means that the decision should not come down
on the side of the parent refusing treatment for a child. Nevertheless, it will be
argued that the state and the courts appear to be as motivated by skepticism about
the validity of religious claims as they are by the compelling nature of the state's
claim.
The jurisprudence on the refusal of medical treatment in Canada suggests that
a competent adult individual's desire to follow his or her own beliefs, including
the religious obligation to refuse life-saving medical treatment, will prevail over
the state's interest in preserving that person's life.' Where children are involved,
218. Young, supra note 215 at 155.
219. Droit de lafamille, supra note 216 at 392.
220. See also Hilley v. Hilley, 405 So.2d. 708 (Ala. S.C. 1981) (court may consider evidence that the
intensity of a parent's religious involvement harms her children), noted by D.L. Beschle, "The
Use of Religion in Custody Disputes" in S.R. Humm et al. eds., Child, Parentand State: Law
and Policy Reader (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). Joseph Mucci has argued that
courts adjudicating in custody and access disputes should openly, rather than quietly, favour
religions that teach liberal values. J. Mucci, "The Effect of Religious Beliefs in Child Custody

Disputes" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 353.

221. For a subsequent case following McLachlin J.'s view in Young and ignoring the dissent in that
case by L-Heureux-Dub6 J., see Voortman v. Voortman (1994), 4 R.F.L. (4th) 250 (Ont. C.A.).
222. See McLachlin, "Who Owns Our Kids?," supra note 95 at 150-53.
223. See e.g. Malette v. Shulman (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. C.A.); L.E. Rozovsky and F.A.
Rozovsky, The CanadianLaw of Consent to Treatment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1990) at 88-90.
American courts have been split on the issue; see Rotunda and Nowak, supra note 168 at 565-66.

44

University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review

Volume 54, Number I

however, the courts are likely to adopt the view stated by Rutledge J. in Prince v.
224
Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached -the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.
Thus, the courts will allow26 the state to override a parental wish that a child not
receive medical treatment.2
In B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, the Ontario Court of
Appeal recognized that interfering in the family's religious decisions on matters of
ultimate importance does implicate a parent's s. 2(a) rights, even though it is the
child that undergoes treatment. 227 The Court found, however, that the parents' right
to determine their child's religious beliefs "is protected by s. 2(a) only so long as
it does not impede the vital and overriding state concern with the life and health of
a child." 28
The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the state's interest in a child's life is
compelling is incontrovertible; what is missing from the decision, however, is
some recognition of the religious family's fear of the arguably graver possibility of damnation or other extratemporal consequences. Without some indication
of how seriously the courts will take religious claims when considering whether
the state may order treatment, the religious parent may justly fear that the court's
reasoning is informed by simple rationalist skepticism about the very validity of
religious claims. This attitude was expressed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in
Morrison v. State: 9
The fact that the subject is an infant child of a parent who, arbitrarily,puts his own
theological belief higher than his duty to preserve the life of his child cannot prevail
over the considerable judgment of an entire people, in a case such as this. 30 [emphasis
added]
This view that religion is fundamentally an arbitrary choice, in comparison with the
224. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
225. Ibid. at 170.
226. See B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1992), 96 D.LR. (4th) 45 (Ont.
C.A.); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd 390

U.5. 598 (1968); K.J. Rampino, Annotation, "Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order
Medical Treatment Over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life is Not Immediately
Endangered" 52 ALR 3d 1118; Rozovsky and Rozovsky, supra note 223 at 87-88.
227. B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society of MetropolitanToronto, ibid. at 76.

228. Ibid. at 79.
229. 252 S.W.2d. 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
230. Ibid. at 101. Quoted in F.A. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A PracticalGuide, 2nd. ed.

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1990) at 339.
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state's purportedly rational and incontestable emphasis on life and health, may also
be detected in cases that have allowed the state to order medical treatment over
religious objections, even where the treatment is not life-saving. 31
The Supreme Court of Canada's recent affirmation of the Ontario Court of Appeal
decision in B.(R.) v. Children'sAid Society of MetropolitanToronto'32 has shed some
further light on tensions within the Court as to how to treat religious freedom in hard
cases. While the Court agreed that the Chartershould not prevent the Children's Aid
Society from gaining temporary custody of the child, the Court split 5 to 4 on how to
apply s. 2(a). Thus, La Forest J. for the majority on this point found that the parents'
religious freedom had been infringed, calling the right to rear one's child according
to religious beliefs, including choosing medical treatments, a "fundamental aspect
of freedom of religion"; 33 however, he held that the infringement was justified
under s. 1.
In short, La Forest J. was willing to concede that choosing one's child's medical
treatment can play a central role in the value system of a religious adherent. Of
equal interest, however, is his treatment of the child's interests:
While it may be conceivable to ground a claim on a child's own freedom of religion,
beliefs in order to do so.
the child must be old enough to entertain some religious 234
S. was only a few weeks old at the time of the transfusion.
This view is even more sharply stated by the minority opinion, written by Iacobucci
and Major JJ. In urging the matter to be settled at the level of s. 2(a) rather than
s. 1, they wrote:
The appellants proceed on the assumption that S. is of the same religion as they, and
hence cannot submit to a blood transfusion. Yet, S. has never expressed any agreement
with the Jehovah's Witness faith, nor, for that matter, with any religion, assuming any
such agreement would be effective. There is thus an impingement upon S.'s freedom
of conscience which arguably includes the right to live long enough to make one's
own reasoned choice about the religion one wishes to follow as well as the right not
to hold a religious belief.235
This opinion indicates the Court's continuing inclination to view religion not
as a cultural phenomenon or (at least for some adherents) communitarian activity,
231. See Re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d. 686 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972) (upholding family court judge's order
authorizing physicians to perform surgery to improve a disfigured youth's appearance despite his
mother's religious objections); Re McTavish and Director,Child Welfare Act (1986), 32 D.L.R.
(4th) 394 (Alta. Q.B.) (upholding provincial court decision overruling parents' refusal to approve
blood transfusions for infant, despite evidence that the parents' position was not medically

unreasonable).
232. (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter B.(R.) v. C.A.S.].

233. Ibid. at 49.
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid. at 91.
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but as a matter of individual choice. The result may be appropriate, by liberal
standards; but it offers little consolation to religious families whose understanding
of religion is as social in nature as it is individual, and who believe that God will
judge their child according to its conduct, regardless of whether the child has made
an autonomous choice. To them, the Court's words indicate that a child is but an
empty vessel, which nominally carries its parents' faith but is essentially irreligious
2 36
and effectively secular until it is old enough to make 'rational' decisions.
It is true that in cases involving children who require medical attention, the state's
claim is at its most pressing; for this reason, I would argue that interventions that
are necessary to protect either a child's health and life or the health and welfare
of others (as in cases where religious adherents seek exemption for themselves or
their children from public vaccination programs) are justifiable. But courts that
are quick to discount the countervailing religious claim, seeing it as a vague or
philosophical position, are likely to make two mistakes. First, they will fail to
give due weight to all the factors that should be considered, spiritual and medical.
Re L.D.K.; Children'sAid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. K. and K.23 offers
a glimpse of a proper approach in this regard. Main Prov. J. faced the issue of
a 12-year-old child of Jehovah's Witnesses, stricken with leukemia, who shared
her parents' view that she should not undergo chemotherapy, which would involve
blood transfusions. The Children's Aid Society applied to have the child declared
in need of protection under the Child Welfare Act3 8 to ensure that the treatment
would take place. Acknowledging the sincerity of the child's religious views and
her reluctance to undergo chemotherapy in any case, the judge accepted her and
her family's wish that she try a mega-vitamin therapy at home, where she
would be surrounded by her family and ... be free to communicate with her God. She
would have peace of mind and could get on with attempting to overcome this dreadful
239
disease with dignity.
Main Prov. J. added:
With this patient, the treatment proposed by the hospital addresses the disease only in
a physical sense. It fails to address her emotional needs and her religious beliefs. It
fails to treat the whole person.240
Second, courts that are skeptical of religious claims will fail to treat the religious
family as a community-as a group of individuals who find religious fulfilment
236. For a recent critique of 'parental rights' arguments that treat the child as falling under the parents'
religion, see J.G. Dwyer, "Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents' Rights" (1994) 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1371.
237. (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct. (Fam. Div.)).
238. R.S.O. 1980, c. 66.
239. Re LD.K., supra note 237 at 169.
240. Ibid.
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and meaning as a communal entity. As I have suggested, an individual rightsbased judicial culture is, rightly, reluctant to treat individuals as non-autonomous,
particularly when dealing with children who have yet to develop their own sense
of judgment;24 but such an approach clearly will not entirely reflect the reality of
religious experience as the believer knows it.
Finally, it should be clear that no matter how sensitively the courts approach
this area, their decisions may send the message that any category of thinking that
cannot be apprehended by a legal tradition steeped in rationalism is, in some way,
wrong; after all, if the court took the religion's belief seriously, it would have
much more difficulty upholding the state's claim against the possibility of eternal
damnation.242 Despite the state's strong claim that a just society must protect the
life of its children, these cases should be among the hardest to decide, not the
easiest. That few courts would find these cases truly difficult leaves us with a clear
conclusion, one that may be applied far beyond the precincts of this one issue: "The
law, in fact, seems to have comparatively little difficulty in discounting religious
'
belief."243
VI. In Defence of Religious Freedom: Evaluating and Valuing the Culture
of Belief within a Liberal Democracy
This article has shown the ways in which liberal democracy devalues religion and
religious freedom: it does so by viewing religion through the lens of the unbeliever
and treating it as a mysterious and threatening force that cannot be understood
by rational, secular reasoning and so must give way to the state's rational goals.
But assuming that we do sometimes need to curtail religious freedom, the mere
knowledge that the legislature and the courts may have a bias in favour of the state
does not determine when that interest should give way to the claims of the religious
believer. A balance must be struck. How, then, in striking this balance, should we
value religion?
As we saw in Part III, the Supreme Court's judgment in Big M begins to answer
that question. But Big M is just one case dealing with one dispute, and so is too
slender a reed on which to hang all future judgments about the value of religious
freedom. Yet little has been written since that judgment, by the courts or Canadian
241. See e.g., Re C.P.L (1988), 70 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 287 at 302 (Nfld. S.C. Unif. Fam. Ct.), per Riche
J. (finding a violation of s. 7 but not s. 2(a) in the apprehension of a child by the Director of
Child Welfare for the purpose of surgery): "A child does not have a religious belief until it
reaches an age of reason." Riche J. does, however, acknowledge the important right of parents to
raise a child in their religion until she reaches maturity. Ibid. at 302-03.
242. See Carter, Culture of Disbelief supra note 13 at 221: "By forcing the Witness to live and be
damned rather than permitting her to die and be saved, the state is necessarily treating her
religious claim not as irrelevant, but as false.... Part of the trouble with contemporary liberal
epistemology is that it is not capable of treating as a factual inquiry a question like 'Can the
Jehovah's Witness achieve salvation after receiving a blood transfusion?'...." See also Ogilvie,
supra note 22 at 112.
243. J.K. Mason and R.A.M. Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994) at
230.
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legal scholars, to expand our understanding of the role of religion in a liberal
244
democracy, and why we may want to protect it even against rational state claims.
This places s. 2(a) in a fragile, precarious position; for, as William P. Marshall
has noted, "A jurisprudence that is not based upon an understanding of the values
' 245
involved is likely to be perceived as shallow, inconsistent, and nonpersuasive.
Indeed, it is clear that a jurisprudence based on an inadequate understanding of
the values and purpose of religious freedom will be shallow and unpersuasive,
24 6
particularly to those religious communities the court most needs to persuade.
Protecting religious freedom thus demands a full accounting of the value of religion
and of the justification for according it special protection. In this section, I shall
suggest a number of ways in which religion is unique and valuable, both to the
individual believer and to society, and thus worthy of protection. If liberalism's
greatest threat to religion is its emphasis on rationalism, then this section may
be seen as an effort to turn rationalism around and use this tool of liberalism to
demonstrate the value of religion to the liberal state in terms it can understand.
A. RELIGION AS INTERMEDIARY COMMUNITY
Beyond the language of individual rights in liberal democracies is the awareness
that society is made up of groups, communities to which individuals may belong.
Though to the outsider such communities may seem less significant than the individuals that comprise them, to the participant the community as a whole may be
more real and more important than his or her own part in it. The individual may
subsume his or her identity as an individual to the authority of the community,
speaking and acting through the corporate community rather than directly as an individual. Thus, the group becomes both a central source of an individual's identity
and an intermediary providing effective and meaningful interaction with citizens
outside the group."47
The value of intermediary communities has been recognized in the Constitutions
of both Canada and, arguably, the United States. In Canada, as has been noted,
the Charterconstitutionalizes the principle of multiculturalism,248 providing both a
244. For some treatments of this issue, see Weinrib, "Reading the Lesson," supra note 62; Cotler,
"Freedom of Conscience and Religion: Section 2(a)," supra note 104.
245. W.P. Marshall, "Truth and the Religion Clauses" (1994) 43 DePaul L. Rev. 243 at 243.
246. See also J.H. Garvey, "Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty" (1986) 18 Conn.
L. Rev. 779 ("One thing that has always bothered me about free exercise jurisprudence is that it
rests on values we have seldom tried to state, much less justify"); S.D. Smith, "The Rise and Fall
of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse" (1991) 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, quoted in
Marshall, "Truth and the Religion Clauses," supra note 245 ("[Itf we cannot articulate a
convincing justification for the commitment to religious freedom then we cannot know its
purpose, and we are accordingly paralyzed in our efforts to interpret the commitment").
247. See Carter, Culture of Disbelief supra note 13 at 37: "Indeed, from Tocqueville's day to
contemporary theories of pluralism, the need for independent mediating institutions has been a
staple of political science."
248. Charter,supra note 6, s. 27: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."
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recognition of the value of intermediary groups and an admonition to protect these
groups' well-being. In the United States, much scholarly attention has recently
been centred on the notion of civic republicanism, which, it has been suggested,
undergirds the development of the American political and constitutional structure.
This theory suggests that the very nature of republican democracy recognizes the
importance of separate groups within society, which band together to collaborate in
the deliberative process of democracy.249 In this regard, Mark Tushnet has noted:
By distinguishing between religion and other forms of belief, the first amendment
contains a nonindividualist principle. It thus signals that the Constitution is not an
entirely individualist document. The Constitution's communitarian commitments take
republicanism which was more
the form of an implicit appeal to a tradition of25 civic
0
vibrant in the framers' world than it is in ours.
Further evidence supporting the protection of intermediary groups may be seen
in the famous "Footnote Four" in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
251
in which Stone J. (as he then was) said:
Carolene Products Co.,
Nor need we inquire into whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious ... or national.., or racial minorities, whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
and which may call for a correspondingly more
relied upon to protect minorities,
252
searching judicial inquiry.
Both through its singling out of religious groups and the language of "discrete and
insular minorities,"" 3 the footnote suggests that religions and other intermediary
groups are valuable but vulnerable to majoritarian decision making, and so deserve
special protection 25 4
Thus, one value of religion is its role as an intermediary institution that provides
value and identity for the individual worshipper and a means of interaction between
the religious community and society at large. In a strongly pluralistic society such
as ours, this should be a persuasive statement in favour of religious freedom.

249. See e.g. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution, supra note 107.
250. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, supra note 129 at 274.

251. 304 U.S. 144 at 152 n. 4 (1938).
252. Ibid.

253. For a significant discussion of this phrase as an aid to structuring and understanding constitutional
rights in the United States, see J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
254. For a discussion of Carotene Products and the protection of religious minorities, criticizing the
Supreme Court's recent decisions on religion, see A.D. Boyle II, "Fear and Trembling at the
Court: Dimensions of Understanding in the Supreme Court's Religion Jurisprudence" (1993) 3
Const. L.J. 55 at 107-13.
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A natural corollary to the idea of religion as intermediary group is that religious
groups may be a source of political action. Religious believers and groups arrive
at a code of moral behaviour through prayerful consideration of the will of God
(or, in less deistic religions, through simple consideration of the moral and ethical
conclusions following from their spiritual beliefs) rather than through obedience to
the dictates of the state. Such groups thus represent an alternative and potentially
competing source of moral understanding. Therefore, due to religiously motivated
beliefs, religious groups may seek changes in the legal status quo, by bearing witness
against a particular legal rule or political regime or through actual disobedience of
the law.
Because religious groups derive their moral principles from a source other than
the state's authority (principles that may also differ from prevailing majoritarian
notions of proper behaviour), they may arrive at-and fight for-a proper conception
of justice where the state and the majority sometimes fail. Moreover, because
religions recognize the permanence of only one authority-that of God, karma, or
whatever spiritual order is at the heart of the ultimate concerns of religion-they will
react against any tendencies on the part of the state to arrogate to itself inordinate
power. This is why William Klassen identifies "the major role of religion in any
society as monitoring the claims governments make for themselves and protesting
the absoluteness of its power inherent in any state."" 5 Indeed, as Stephen Carter
notes, the very existence of an autonomous religious group within society is a
profoundly anti-authoritarian statement:
A religion is, at is heart, a way of denying the authority of the rest of the world; it
to the state those fellow humans have
is a way of saying to fellow human beings and
'' 6
erected, "No, I will not accede to your will. 25
The value of religion as a powerful force for resistance and social change has
long been recognized. Religion has played a central role in advocating social change
well into recent decades, even as religiosity on the part of many individuals has
waned.5 7 Tocqueville noted that religion provides a valuable moral restraint on
the state by informinig the moral consciences of the governors and the governed.,,'
In recent history, a prominent example of religion as a political force has been
255. Klassen, "Religion and the Nation," supra note 7 at 98.
256. Carter, Culture of Disbelief,supra note 13 at 41.
257. See Howe, Garden and Wilderness, supra note 68 at 62: "We all know that American churchmen
and American churches have, throughout our history, played an important role in public
affairs.... Whether the cause has been abolition, prohibition, or integration, the churches and
their leaders have played a central, sometimes a crucial, role in translating what the churches
perceived to be moral principle into rules of law."
258. See A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New York: Everyman's Library, 1994)
(1835) at 305: "Thus, while the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion
prevents them from conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust."
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the civil rights movement in the United States, as exemplified in the person of the
Rev. Martin Luther King. King's actions can be seen as much as a reflection of
his concern for the spiritual life of the nation as a reflection of his concerns over
the temporal effects of injustice; his call for civil disobedience against laws that
do not "[square] with the moral law or the law of God ' " 9 and his cry that he was
"compelled to carry the gospel of freedom '" clearly indicate the religious thread
running through his activism.
In Ontario(Attorney General) v. Dieleman, Adams J. noted:
Dr. Martin Luther King's inspirational speeches often called on God and on spiritual
values. But I am sure many who joined in that movement did so for reasons not based
on their religious faith.261
Of course, beyond the inspiration they offered to others, many who led and joined
the movement, King included, were substantially motivated by religious compulsion. Just as King called on God in his speeches, so it would be accurate to say
that according to his perception, Dr. King's God and his spiritual values called on
him to make the speeches and to lead the fight for change. To this day, religious
commitments to, inter alia, "the sacredness of life, to peace, to justice, to freedom, or to the independence of religious organizations from improper government
regulation ' 262 continue to motivate social criticism and activism.
Two risks are posed when religion is permitted to play a productive part in the
political realm: religious groups might be forced to homogenize their beliefs to
achieve effectiveness as public actors263 or they might "not merely pluralize public
life, but may attempt to sacralize it, by casting secularism out of the political temple and replacing it with sectarianism. '2 64 Moreover, some may strongly oppose
certain positions taken by religious groups; as Sanford Levinson has commented,
"the moral valence assigned to resistance may well depend on who is resisting
what.' 265 None of these concerns, however, equals the value of religion as a social and political force. Religious groups in societies that recognize the value of
pluralism, and whose practices and peculiarities are respected, are less likely to
need to resort to homogenization when seeking social change. As for fears of
259. M.L. King, Jr., "Letter From Birmingham Jail" in Why We Can't Wait (New York: Signet Books,
1964) at 82.
260. Ibid. at 77.
261. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dielemnan, supra note 42 at 331.
262. See statement of the American Lutheran Church in Perry, Morality, Politics,and Law: A
BicentennialEssay, supra note 125 at 206.
263. See K.M. Sullivan, "God as a Lobby" (1994) 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1655 at 1668; Ogilvie, supra
note 22 at 107, notes the dangers of blending religious beliefs with "apparently compatible
secular ideologies" in order to communicate with and get along with others: "But accommodation
has too often metamorphosed into assimilation, so that purportedly Christian communities often
minimize and trivialize belief to the point of non-recognition."
264. Gedicks, "Some Political Implications of Religious Belief," supra note 109 at 447.
265. S.Levinson, "The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief' (1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1873 at 1883.
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hegemony, if pluralistic, Madisonian values prevail, the multiplicity of sects, with
their divergent interests, should ward off any serious fear of tyranny by a religious
majority (particularly where, as in Canadian society, evangelical religions are less
prominent).266
Furthermore, as for the concern about the particular views that religious groups
may espouse, such differences already exist between non-religious groups and
should not bar entry into the public sphere by religious groups. Indeed, it is not
the particular change advocated that makes religion important; it is the fact that a
social force exists outside the state, operating according to a different worldview
and denying the absolute authority of the state and the infallibility of its views. In
this sense, religion serves the "checking" value put forward by Vincent Blasi as a
justification for the Speech, Press, and Assembly clauses of the First Amendment:
[It] can serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials.... [It] facilitat[es]
a process by which countervailing forces check the misuse of official power ... by
protecting the dignity of the individual, [and] maintaining a diverse society in the face
267
of conformist pressures.
Religion, then, has a strong instrumental value as a source of and inspiration for
social criticism and activism, and as a structural check on the absolute authority of
the state.
C. RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF NEW IDEAS
Beyond any particular political dispute in a liberal democracy, one must remember
that the nature of deliberative liberal democracy suggests a continuing clash of ideas
in the civic arena, in which liberalism and secularism are generally observed as the
ground rules of the debate; it is somewhat like a continuing dialogue between likeminded people whose opinions vary on minor points and not major premises. For
example, however heated a public debate about gun control may become, one can
be certain that both sides will argue from the same general common values: safety,
security, freedom, responsibility, etc. Both sides will understand the terms of the
debate.
Religion, for its part, may enrich liberal democracy by arguing from outside
the sphere of common definitions and concepts. Religion derives its principles
from prayer, fellowship, revelation, and the reading of sacred texts, among other
sources. Therefore, it may come up with values and arguments that do not resemble
anything seen in the moral structure of liberal democracy. In this way, religion
may generate new modes of reasoning and contribute new ideas and methods to the
266. For an argument that the constitutional structure designed by Madison has both protected religion
and prevented it from becoming too powerful, see C.L. Eisgruber, "Madison's Wager: Religious
Liberty in the Constitutional Order" (1995) 89 Nw. L. Rev. 347.
267. V. Blasi, "The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory" [1977] Am.B. Found. Res. J. 521 at

527.
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liberal democratic dialogue, which would otherwise run the risk of growing stale
68
and self-justifying.
Thus, not only may religion argue for political change, but it may transform and
renew the political debate (this is meant in a broad sense, of course) by introducing
unfamiliar concepts and principles.269
D. RELIGION AS CORE SELF-EXPRESSION
So far, this section's discussion of the value of religion has focused on religion's
structural value in contributing to the health and vigour of the liberal democratic
polity, rather than adopting the common liberal focus on the value of rights to the
individual. I have done so to suggest that religion's value is greater than may be
recognized by a pure rights-based approach and that religious groups are essential
to the social and political well-being of liberal democracy. In a pluralistic society,
it has been argued, we must recognize the structural benefits of protecting religious
groups and their practices, even where they deviate from the state's goals. A larger
political benefit is derived from preserving the health of mediating institutions to
serve as a check on the state.
Religion is equally valuable, however, if viewed through the lens of individual
rights. As a society that exalts the autonomy of the individual, we value those
aspects of an individual that represent the most profound and central parts of his
or her identity-and religion is surely a central aspect of one's identity. In Irwin
Toy v. Quebec (A.G.),27 the Supreme Court recognized three core values in the
s. 2(b) right of freedom of expression, and each is equally applicable to freedom
of religion: "[The pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual
self-fulfillment and human flourishing."27' If the justifications for religious freedom
adumbrated above address participation in the community, we must also remember
the centrality of religion to the individual self-fulfilment of the believer.272
The Court directly recognized this aspect of religion in Big M, in which Dickson
J. emphasized "the centrality of individual conscience and the inappropriateness of

268. See Eisgruber, supra note 266 at 374: "Reason must be open to the possibility of its own
inadequacy." See also ibid. at 349: "[R]eligion is a source of especially virulent political
factions, but it is also a valuable haven for political and philosophical diversity."
269. This militates against Daniel Conkle's suggestion that some religious arguments may be more
valuable in the public sphere because of their ability to communicate with the secular world and
show openness to competing ideas; see D.O. Conkle, "Different Religions, Different Politics:
Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law" (1993-94)
10 J.L. & Religion 1. Thus, fundamentalism, for example, is not capable of the "deliberative,
dialogic decision-making process" he thinks is necessary for productive political debate. Ibid. at
16. But if we wish to find sources of ideas far outside the commonplace terms of debate of the
liberal arena, we must look to religions that exist outside the common framework of liberal debate.
270. Supra note 159.

271. Ibid. at 977.
272. For a discussion of the truth-seeking value of religion, see Marshall, "Truth and the Religion
Clauses," supra note 245.
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governmental intervention to compel or to constrain its manifestation. '273 The need
to protect the autonomous individual's strongly held beliefs is particularly important
because such beliefs may be vulnerable to modern social pressures, as the Supreme
Court of California eloquently noted in People v. Woody:
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of a
self-expression, however, unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more
important. The varying currents of the subcultures
that flow into the mainstream of
274
our national life give it depth and beauty.
Clearly, then, religion serves more than a structural value. When we value religion, we express the same impulse that underlies the very creation of the Charternamely, the impulse to cherish and protect the individual's fundamental right to
shape and express an identity, even in the face of state imperatives.
E. RELIGION AS COMPULSION
Recognizing the centrality of religion to the individual leads naturally to the observation that, whereas some non-religious beliefs may be deeply held, religious beliefs
are unique in creating what, to the religious believer, is an external compulsionan obligation based on one's duty to a supernatural force or being. The price of
disobedience may be the loss of salvation, a punishment beyond the scope of mere
worldly punishments such as fines or imprisonment. But the fact that the state's
punishments are minor compared to spiritual punishment does not mean that they
are insignificant, or that the religious adherent does not want to obey the law. Thus,
the religious observer is in a vulnerable position, caught between his or her desire
2 75
to be a good citizen and the ineluctable call to religious duty and obedience.
If we value deeply held beliefs, and if we are sympathetic to the premises of
religious belief despite our own lack of particular religious beliefs, then we must
recognize that respect for religious compulsions dictates a strong protection of religious freedom. This is so not merely for the sake of the individual, but for the
sake of society. After all, religious believers are as likely as any others to be-and
to want to be-good citizens. If we value their participation in society and their
loyalty to the common project of creating ajust state, we must respect their absolute
need, under some circumstances, to be exempted from particular laws; otherwise,
we lose the willing participation in society of a valued citizen. Perversely, it has
been suggested that respect for religious freedom may entail allowing barriers to
remain in the path of the religious observer. 276 But such views do not recognize the
273. Big M, supra note 2 at 361.
274. People v. Woody, supra note 187 at 821.

275. See McConnell, "Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses," supra note 40 at 152: "TIhe believer
stands in a unique position with respect to secular government: he is vulnerable to inconsistent
obligations that cannot be reconciled in purely secular terms."
276. See West, "The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions," supra note 118 at 637:

Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion

full value of the religious citizen as a citizen, and the importance of preserving this
value by not branding such people as lawbreakers. Rather, the state should ease
the way for the religious observer, so he or she is not faced with a choice between
duty to God or to Caesar, and thus forced to risk being lost to one or the other.
Finally, as A. Bradney has pointed out, we must recognize that how we treat
religious compulsions is more than a sign of how much we value individual autonomy or our desire to preserve a citizen's benefit to society. It is also a telling sign
of the liberal state's own moral principles:
Faced with an individual conscience, resolved to act for itself alone, a mere legal system
can do nothing. Penalties will not alter the true believer's mind. The only question
for a legal system that is held out as being liberal is, in punishing or stigmatising a
believer for their faith, what damage will the legal system do to the conception of
itself?2 7

F. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF RELIGION
Finally, a proper evaluation of religion and its value must acknowledge that beyond
any political, instrumental, or rights-based justifications for religious freedom is
the simple belief that religion is an intrinsic good, whose value can be recognized
without recourse to demonstrations of its value to society at large. 78 After all, this
article has argued that religion must be valued on its own terms, for its intrinsic
worth, and not just for the ways in which it benefits the liberal state.
An intrinsic worth justification for religion argues that religion is, in some indefinable way, sui generis, not merely a special species of conscientious belief. This
may pose difficulties to the strictly rational liberal mind: in the rational conception,
moral beliefs that are a part and parcel of religious faith may seem identical to moral
principles not derived from religion, while the theological aspects of religious belief
will simply seem like any other arbitrary, unprovable assertion. But a sympathetic
understanding of religion should treat religiously derived morals and theological
"[From the standpoint of certain religious traditions, having to 'stand up' for the faith from time
to time is beneficial to that faith." See also S.L. Carter, "The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom?" (1993) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 118 at 137: "The late Robert Cover was doubtless correct
to point out that the centrality of a proposition to a religion is not truly tested until all of the
state's forces-not excluding the courts-line up on the other side and the oppressed religion
must decide whether to abandon what it claims to cherish. One hopes that the opportunities for
testing of that kind will be rare."
277. A. Bradney, Religions, Rights and Laws (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) at 161.
278. Scott Idleman, reviewing Carter's The Culture of Disbelief,expresses a concern that instrumental
justifications for religious freedom, and in particular religious exemptions, will not protect a
religious practice when it will not lead to a social benefit. S.C. Idleman, "The Sacred, the
Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief' (1994) 142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1313 at 1314. While it is unlikely that social benefit analysis would take place on a
case-by-case basis once the general principle of the instrumental value of religion has been
recognized, his concern does point to a deficiency in instrumental justifications for religion.
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beliefs as parts of a whole, inseparable and mysterious, easily recognized but always eluding definition. The intrinsic value argument is not subject to proof or
justification and it is dependent on the willingness of a skeptical society to respect
a leap of faith. Consequently, it is plainly ill-suited to the culture of the law and
liberalism. All the same, I would argue, as an intuitive proposition it is both clear
and compelling. Even those who lack religious faith can understand the ineffable
and invaluable quality of religious commitment: it is a quest for possibilities that
are foreclosed by rational systems of belief, a claim to transcendence in a world
whose physical nature apparently speaks of inherent limits. Scott Idleman sums up
religion's intrinsic value most eloquently:
At its core, intrinsic worth rests on the possibility that there is meaning to be found
beyond the profanity of our day-to-day, hand-to-mouth existence-within realms we
might call the spiritual, or the supernatural, or the sacred-and on the ultimate or
transformative significance that this possibility holds for our lives as individuals and
as communities.279

VII.

A Model Approach to Freedom of Religion

If the liberal state is infused with a full understanding of the value of religion, and
recognizes the instrumental and intrinsic benefits of religion that this article has
described, how will the state approach the guarantee of freedom of religion? More
specifically, if we now understand more clearly the value of s. 2(a) of the Charter,
what general rules should govern our approach to the right and to the limits to that
right provided by s. 1 of the Charter? While it is difficult to create such rules in
the absence of specific disputes, I suggest that any state consideration of religion,
whether by the legislature or the courts, should be informed by the following three
principles.
First, in any conflict between religion and the state, the state or the court should
attempt, when balancing the interests of the religious believer, to approach the
problem from the believer's perspective. As we have seen, many judgments in
disputes between state goals and religious beliefs are informed by a skepticism that
treats religion as an individual belief-a valuable belief, perhaps, but a mere belief
nonetheless. Against this belief is mustered the rational, provable interests of the
state. Particularly where there may already be a general attitude of deference to
the state,28 a religious claim will be far more likely to fall short in the balance
if it is examined from a rationalist perspective, or even a sympathetic outsider's
perspective.
Accordingly, a legislature drafting legislation that may affect religion, or a judge
balancing religious freedoms against state imperatives, should attempt to give the
279. Ibid. at 1367.
280. See Dassios and Prophet, supra note 154.
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religious claim the value that the believer would assign to it. This entails a temporary abandonment of the rationalism that is a hallmark of legal reasoning and,
effectively, the adoption of non-rational premises. But this step is necessary to give
full weight to both sides of the church-state conflict.
This rule will be balanced by two considerations. First, it may be difficult to
give full credit to the concept of damnation, because it could become an automatic
exemption from any further consideration of the importance of the state's goals.
Still, the ultimate importance of a religious duty should be taken seriously enough
that the legislature or courts will do their best to avoid interference with it.
Also, adopting the religious believer's position does not eliminate the consideration of the reasonableness of a state limit on a religious practice under s. 1, and
there may still be situations in which the state's interests will outweigh the religious
duty. Adopting the believer's position simply means that, just as a court accepts
rationally argued goals as legitimate, it will also be obliged to treat religious beliefs
as legitimate and accurate, even though they defy proof by rational means.
Second, given the value of religion as enumerated in Part VI, the state should be
required to show a truly compelling interest before it can overcome a conflicting
religious claim. A compelling interest must be an interest in achieving an essential
goal, one that goes to the heart of democratic values or the survival of the state,
rather than a mere reasonable, rational state goal. After all, if religion's value is
central to the health and vigour of the state, as I have suggested above, it would
be unreasonable to allow a more quotidian state interest to overcome the broader
state interest in preserving religion. Moreover, if the state would still be able to
achieve its compelling interest if the religious believer is exempted, the religious
claim should prevail; only if an exemption would make it impossible for the state
to achieve its interest against anyone should the state win.
Of course, language suggesting the need for a compelling interest is contained
in both the accommodation line of cases in the United States, such as Yoder,281 and
Oakes' s. 1 test in Canada.282 The rule as I have suggested it, however, would differ
from each country's current approach to the justification of state claims. First, it
would be applicable against any state claim, including generally applicable state
laws, unlike the rule set forth in Smith. Thus, even a state rule of broad application would be required to meet a strict justification standard when applied against
religious believers, even if this increases the administrative burden on the state.
Clearly, an infringement of a religious belief is of grave concern to the observer
whether or not it is contained in a law of general application; and administrative
inconvenience is a small price to pay to preserve religion's larger value to the liberal
democratic state.
Second, the rule would require courts to carefully scrutinize the importance of
the state's goals to the preservation of a free and democratic society. An objective
that is reasonable, valid, and important would not necessarily overcome a religious
281. Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra note 31.
282. R. v. Oakes, supra note 152.
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claim. This suggests a stricter
approach to the justification test than the courts have
283
in fact adopted in Canada.
It should be clear that despite these stringent protections, some restrictions on
religious activity would ultimately be considered justifiable. This is the realm of
the hard cases. No perfect guide is available to guide the courts' actions in such
cases. Nevertheless, it might be said that harm to non-religious third parties, or
grave harm to those who are religious but not perfectly autonomous and thus under
the special care of the state, would justify interference with religious obligations.
For instance, there is little doubt that the state's interest in protecting the health of
children would justify interference with a family's religious beliefs in order to save
the life of a child through a blood transfusion. Similarly, though some families have
religious objections to vaccination programs, the state's overwhelming interest in
the public health, and the impossibility of securing the goal of public health through
other means, would justify a restriction of the family's religious freedom.
In cases of grave harm to religious but non-autonomous individuals such as
children, the courts should seek the least restrictive means of interference with
religion. For example, a religious practice that involves mutilation of children
should be restricted, but a solution might be sought that bars the offending practice
while allowing a harmless, symbolic substitute for the practice to continue.
Other state interests would, however, be required to give way to religious freedom
if a strict level of scrutiny were required. The state's interest in a common pause
day, for instance, is surely not as essential as the religious adherent's need to
worship; nor is the participation of the worshipper utterly necessary to the goal of
providing a reasonably successful pause day. Similarly, the state's laws against
the use of narcotics should not be held to override the essential place of narcotics
such as peyote in the ceremonies of certain religions. Clearly, some limits would
still result from the effort to strike a reasonable balance between religious freedom
and significant state goals, even after courts begin to give significant weight to the
religious adherent's claims. These limits would, however, be more sensibly drawn.
Finally, given religion's importance to a free and democratic society, we should
expect more of the state than the requirement that it show a compelling interest
before it infringes on religious freedom; it should also show an awareness of its
positive duty to advance religious freedom. It can do so in two ways: granting
exemptions from generally applicable laws, and engaging in legislative efforts to
aid religion.
Granting religiously based exemptions, both at the level of legislative drafting
and as a constitutional imperative read into neutral laws that interfere with an
individual's religious duties, would signal the state's recognition that if we wish
to capture the full value of the religious citizen, we must occasionally treat him
or her differently. Such exemptions would put the structural value of religion
in democratic society above the value of particular state schemes. Ultimately,
283. See Hogg, "Section 1 Revisited," supra note 154 at 7-8 (noting that, despite the language of
Oakes, it has not been difficult to show a pressing and substantial governmental objective).

Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion

despite its interference with state goals, the exemption will further the religious
believer's ability to practice his or her faith and advance the state's interest in the
full participation of its citizens in the life of the nation. The value of exemptions,
thus perceived, clearly outweighs those losses that would be suffered when some
individuals sought exemption from some laws.
It may be argued that religiously based exemptions violate the s. 15 guarantee of
equality "before and under the law."2 ' I would respond that the exemption should
not be viewed as a special grant of privilege to a few, but as a manifestation of the
right to religious freedom to which everyone is entitled.2" Neither should the fact
that different religions require different exemptions cause any difficulty, since the
Supreme Court recognized in Big M that "the interests of true equality may well
require differentiation in treatment" of different faiths.286
The principle of aid to religion suggests that in addition to the exemption of
religious believers from neutral laws, the state should ensure that the social value
of religion is reinforced by lending its support to religious groups. A pertinent
example is the funding of religious schools. While the jurisprudence indicates
no constitutional obligation to fund religious education for groups not enumerated
in s. 93 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,287 a richer understanding of the value of
having strong religious groups in society ought to indicate the appropriateness of
extending aid for religious schooling to those faiths that were not rewarded in the
Confederation compromise.
Certainly more is required than the curt statement of the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Adler that religious parents are offered a choice between sending their children
to public schools and sending them elsewhere, and thus that their difficulty lies with
their religious beliefs and not with any government action.288 To religious parents
whose beliefs require them to send their children to religious schools, but who lack
the means to pay for private schooling, that choice is no choice at all. Such a
statement is reminiscent of the position taken by employers, prior to the advent of
human rights laws, that Saturday sabbatarians had a choice between working on
284. Charter,supra note 6; see Black, supra note 39 at 163-64.
285. See McConnell, "Religious Freedom at a Crossroads," supra note 134 at 139: "To conceive of
free exercise exemptions as requests for special benefits implicitly assumes that the state has the
natural authority to regulate the church, and that choosing not to do so is a favor. That is not the
inalienable right to freedom of religion conceived by those who wrote and ratified the First
Amendment." Similarly, since the fundamental right of freedom of religion is enshrined in the
Charter, an exemption that gives effect to that right can hardly be said to be creating a novel
inequality. This accords with Dickson J.'s expansive definition of freedom of religion in Big M,
supra note 2 at 362.
286. Big M, ibid.
287. See Reference Re Bill 30, supra note 3; Adler, supra note 3; Bal v. Ontario (A.G.) (1994), 121

D.L.R. (4th) 96 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (the government is not obliged to provide funding for
minority religious alternative schools within the public school system).
288. See Adler, supra note 3 at 18. Equally arguable is the Bal and Adler courts' conflation of
'secular' education with neutral education. See Stolzenberg, supra note 56, for a discussion of
how public schools, by advancing pluralistic and ultimately relativistic values, may pose a threat
to religious cultures that may be part of our pluralistic society but are not themselves pluralistic.
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Saturday or looking for other work. Through the human rights laws, governments
recognized the perversity of allowing someone the freedom to starve under such
circumstances and required employers to bear a greater social cost to accommodate
religious workers. Courts should recognize that the 'choice' is no less perverse in
religious-education funding cases, and that the government is the most appropriate
cost-bearer in such circumstances. Moreover, even if the courts find no positive
duty to fund religious education, legislatures are not thereby freed from their duty
to give full recognition to the constitutional and social value of s. 2(a). Whichever
institution ultimately acts, the significant need to provide an appropriate level of
genuine accommodation to religious parents should be recognized, even if that
means bearing the social cost of funding or contributing to religious education.
The provision of aid to religious groups does raise the question of whether such
aid, if not apportioned exactly among all faiths, would create the impression that the
imprimatur of the state has been given to certain faiths and not others. As a matter
of practicality, it may not be possible to aid religious groups equally; majority faiths,
though they may need less aid, would be more likely to receive aid, since they have
the greatest political power. This does not pose any problems under s. 2(a) of
the Charter: so long as preferential religious aid does not "[impose] on religious
minorities a compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the majority,"2 89
it would not violate s. 2(a).290 Still, since one of the purposes of providing aid to
religious institutions is to advance the social good of pluralism, a value which is
it is hoped that the
given credence by the multiculturalism clause of the Charter,
29
state will spread its largesse among a variety of groups. '
Other than that, however, aid to religion should be constrained by only two
considerations. It must not create an "element of religious compulsion 292 on the
part of any believers or non-believers in a given faith. 293 Also, while government
aid may properly create the impression that the state is as supportive of religion as
it is of other mediating institutions, it should not create the impression that it has
singled out a particular faith, or religiosity over non-religiosity, for endorsement. 9 4
Zylberberg, supra note 98 at 591.
A credible argument might, however, be launched under the equality clause of the Charter.
Sections 15 and 27 of the Charter might play a useful role in guaranteeing this outcome.
Big M, supra note 2 at 364. See also Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario(Minister of
Education) (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
293. This would not capture aid to separate religious schools, which I assume to be private institutions
established for 'voluntary' use by religious families. If anything, such schools allow the state to
avoid providing separate religious educations to myriad cultural groups in a given public school,
while permitting religious communities to avoid educations that effectively compel a neutral,
liberal viewpoint.
294. O'Connor J. has advanced an 'endorsement' test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which
would ask whether government aid in a given case "sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." See Lynch v.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 at 1367 (1984) (O'Connor J. concurring). The test has, however, been
criticized as "no test at all, but merely a label for the judge's largely subjective impressions." See
Paulsen, "Lemon Is Dead," supra note 195 at 815. See also Choper, supra note 47 at 27-34.
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Endorsement, even if it does not compel behaviour on the part of the minority,
defeats the pluralism and multiculturalism that are a central part of religion's value
to society.
In summary, an approach to religious freedom that shows a proper appreciation
of the value of religion as a productive force in society will do its best to exempt
religion from onerous requirements, unless the state's need overwhelms the importance of religious duty. Such a balancing test must give full and fair weight to the
religious obligation as felt by the observer, even though this requires the judge to
deviate from the norm of rationality. Finally, given religion's social value, the state
should not hesitate to aid and advance religious institutions, so long as it is not too
closely identified with any one of them.
Would such an approach substantially change the outcomes of cases involving
claims of religious freedom? In hard cases involving conflicts between religion and
central projects of the state, such as the preservation of a child's life despite the
parents' wish that the child not undergo medical treatment, I doubt that it would.
In other cases, the increased respect for the social value of religious freedom might
well tilt the balance against the state. In any event, in judicial decisions more is at
stake than the outcome of an individual case. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's words
are worth noting once more: "How the courts talk about religion is critical, because
the texture of the public discourse about religion creates a culture about religion." 295
The loyalty of a citizen to the state, and the likelihood that that person will fully
contribute to his or her society, is surely related to how that person is treated by the
state. If the language of the courts indicates a measure of indifference toward, or
lack of comprehension of, religion and its value, the courts will cease to command
the respect or obedience of many who would otherwise be valuable citizens. Thus,
even if individual outcomes do not change, a judicial and legislative approach to
religious freedom that is properly respectful of the value of religion will result in a
stronger and healthier society.
VMI.

Conclusion: Glimmers of Hope

I have argued in this article that liberalism's virtues-its focus on individual rights,
its emphasis on individual belief as individual choice, its rationalism-have the
unfortunate effect of narrowing the state's and the courts' understanding of the
nature and value of religion. Liberal democracy has a long tradition of protecting
religious belief, as manifested in s. 2(a) of the Charter. But the ineffable and
irrational nature of religion has meant that religious claims are sometimes viewed
with skepticism, and may lose out when balanced against the claims of the state,
which are argued in the language of rationalism that liberal democracy finds so
attractive. It has been suggested that once we attain a proper understanding of the
intrinsic worth of religious belief, and the social value of religions as intermediary
institutions that guard against tyranny and complacency, we will be more willing to
295. Sullivan, supra note 23 at 163.
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accord full protection to the beliefs and practices of religious believers, even when
they ask the state to balance irrational claims against the state's rational arguments.
Of course, cold rationalism is not the only strain in liberal political discourse;
one may also find appreciation for pluralism and respect for the compelling nature
of religious claims. Furthermore, religious voices have not been completely absent
from the political dialogue and have certainly helped to ensure that the vision of the
state that emerges from the legislatures and the courts is not compeletely indifferent
to the fate of religion. In both the United States and Canada, one may still witness
signs that religious freedom will be allowed to flourish as it ought.
In Canada, encouraging developments have emerged from human rights jurisprudence. In this area, the courts and the legislatures have supported religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Thus, for instance, Ontario's Human Rights
Code296 allows religious organizations to discriminate in employment where it is a
bonafide occupational requirement that an employee share the organization's faith
or meet its religious standards.'
Even more important has been the courts' growing support of the principle of
accommodation of religious practices in the secular workplace. In Re Bhinder and
C.N.R. Co.,29 a Sikh, whose faith required him to wear a turban, brought suit
against Canadian National Railway after it fired him for refusing to wear a safety
helmet. The Supreme Court held that a safety helmet was a bonafide occupational
requirement in a railway coach yard and that once the company established the
validity of the requirement it was under no duty to accommodate the worker. This
misstep was effectively corrected in CentralAlberta DairyPool v. Alberta (Human
Rights Commission),' in which a worker was fired because he was unable to go to
work on two holy days. The Court held that even where, as here, there was a bona
fide occupational requirement that would allow discrimination against the religious
believer, the employer must prove that it attempted to accommodate the believer
up to the point of undue hardship. Thus, Canadian courts have, at least in the
context of human rights legislation, shown that they are willing to require society
to structure itself to pay proper respect to the needs of the religious believer. 3 "
While the courts' definition of what constitutes an undue hardship may prove a
thorny area,3 ' it is at least clear that "[tihe existence of a duty to accommodate
296. R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19.
297. Ibid., s. 23. Followed in Garrodv. Rhema ChristianSchool (1992), 15 C.H.R.R. D/477 (Ont. Bd,
Inquiry). See also Re Caidwell and Stuart (1984), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) (bonafide
qualifications of a Catholic school teacher include a willingness to obey the doctrines of the

Church).
298.
299.
300.
301.

(1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.).
(1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417 (S.C.C.).
See also Renauld v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970.
In the United States, the strength of a similar requirement in protecting religious practices was
significantly undercut in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (1977), in which
the Supreme Court held that anything more than a de minimis cost would constitute an undue
hardship. The Court thus allowed the airline to terminate a Sabbatarian observer's employment,
ruling that it was more important to preserve the seniority system established between the airline
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now seems indisputable."3 It is hoped that this principle will be extended beyond
and embraced as an essential part of the
the context of human rights legislation
0 3
guarantee of freedom of religion.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has not yet backed away decisively from
the unfortunate Smith decision. Its most recent decision in the area, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,3" continued to follow Smith's rule that a generally
applicable law need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest.305 The
result in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, which concerned a law specifically
targeted at the religious sacrifice of animals, favoured the protection of the religious
practice. For that reason, some have seen in this case "a glimmer of hope that the
Court may be ready to try a different way." 3' That hope may be premature; but
there have been signs of support for religion on other fronts.
In particular, in reaction to cases such as Smith, the United States Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,3o which forbids Congress
from substantially burdening an exercise of religion unless the law forwards a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of securing the
interest. 3 8 The law declares as a legislative finding that "laws 'neutral' toward
religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise." 3 Thus, Congress has forced the Court back to the pre-Smith
standard of review for religious claims.3 10 While it is still too early to judge the
effectiveness of theReligious FreedomRestoration Act,31' it seems likely to provide

302.
303.

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

311.

and the employees' union than to disturb it for the sake of accommodating Hardison's religious
beliefs.
W.W. Black, "Accommodation of Religious Beliefs and Practices" in McArdle, ed., The
Cambridge Lectures 1991, supra note 54 at 173.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Department of Justice recently floated the idea of a
"culture defence" from criminal responsibility. Under this defence, a Sikh with a ceremonial
knife could be protected against a charge of carrying a concealed weapon, and one who used
drugs for religious purposes would be similarly protected. See Department of Justice Canada,
"Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper" (Ottawa: Department
of Justice, 1995).
113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993).
Ibid. at 2226, per Kennedy J. In a concurrence, Souter J. urged that "in a case presenting the
issue, the Court should re-examine the rule Smith declared." Ibid. at 2240.
See Carter, "The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?," supra note 276 at 123.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l(a),(b).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
Note, too, that state courts since Smith have shown a willingness to use the religious freedom
guarantees in state constitutions to apply a compelling interest standard to state laws; thus, both
levels of jurisdiction have reacted to Smith by working around it to ensure the protection of
religious freedom. See S.G. Parsell, Note, "Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under
State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith" (1993) 68 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 747.
For cases applying the Act, see Powell v. Stafford, 859 F.Supp. 1343 (D.Colo. 1994) (age
discrimination suit against Catholic high school fails; application of an age discrimination statute
would violate the Religion Clauses, and the state must show a compelling interest); Western
PresbyterianChurch v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994) (Church's
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a breathing space for religious believers whose practices cast them into the minority
that is so callously treated by Smith, at least until the Court is ready to reconsider

its decision in that case.
We have much to be grateful for, then, but still more reason to be cautious and

312
watchful. Given liberalism's emphasis on "the rational, empirical, and factual,"

the more ethereal virtues of religion, and the still more inexpressible call of religious
duty, are all too liable to be shrugged aside as individual values and choices that
must give way to secular progress, rather than cherished as forces that have the

highest possible claim on the religious community. Without proper regard for the
value of religion as experienced by the believer, we may forget that religion's claims
on human destiny are ancient; the state's, only temporal and transient.
A voice raised in dissent provides us with our final reminder. The rights accorded
to religion must not be "reduced to the level of merely expendable desiderata. They
of the proper
ought instead to be given their proper weight as critical expressions
313
constitutional boundary between the state and the individual.

conduct in feeding the homeless was religious conduct, and zoning board must show a
compelling interest before it can burden the conduct). However, in 1994 the Supreme Court
denied certiorari to Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska S.C.
1994), in which the Alaskan Supreme Court upheld a law preventing landlords from
discriminating against potential tenants on the basis of marital status; the landlord, Swanner,
argued that his religious convictions prevented him from renting to those who live together
outside of marriage. The Court followed Smith in finding that no compelling interest was
necessary, and argued that in any case a compelling interest had been shown. Thomas J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari, rightly argued that the lower court's decision "drains the
word compelling of any meaning and seriously undermines the protection for exercise of religion
that Congress so emphatically mandated in RFRA [the Act]." See 115 S.Ct. 460 (1994) at 462.
312. Cook, "God-Talk in a Secular World," supra note 127 at 436.
313. Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 404 at 413 (8th Cir. 1994) (Morris Sheppard Arnold Cir. J.,
dissenting).

